Computational models of trust for cooperative evolution. Reputation based game theoretic models of trust for cooperative evolution in online business games. by Bista, Sanat K.
 University of Bradford eThesis 
This thesis is hosted in Bradford Scholars – The University of Bradford Open Access 
repository. Visit the repository for full metadata or to contact the repository team 
  
© University of Bradford. This work is licenced for reuse under a Creative Commons 
Licence. 
 
  
 
Computational Models of Trust for 
Cooperative Evolution  
 
Reputation Based Game Theoretic Models of Trust for 
Cooperative Evolution in online Business Games 
 
 
 
 
 
Sanat Kumar BISTA 
 
 
 
Submitted for the degree 
 Of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
Department of Computing 
University of Bradford 
 
 
2010
  II 
 
Abstract 
Online services such as e-marketplaces, social networking sites, online 
gaming environments etc have grown in popularity in the recent years. These 
services represent situation where participants do not get to negotiate face to 
face before interaction and most of the time parties to transaction remain 
anonymous. It is thus necessary to have a system that rightly assesses 
trustworthiness of the other party in order to maintain quality assurance in such 
systems. Recent works on Trust and Reputation in online communities have 
focused on identifying probable defaulters, but less effort has been put to 
come up with system that make cooperation attractive over defection in order 
to achieve cooperation without enforcement. Our work in this regard concerns 
design and investigation of trust assessment systems that not only filter 
defaulters but also promote evolution of cooperativeness in player society.    
  
Based on the concept of game theory and prisoner‟s dilemma, we model 
business games and design incentive method, compensation method, 
acquaintance based assessment method and decision theoretic assessment 
method as mechanisms to assure trustworthiness in online business 
environments. Effectiveness of each of these methods in promoting the 
evolution of cooperation in player society has been investigated. Our results 
show that these methods contribute positively in promoting cooperative 
evolution.      
  
We have further extended our trust assessment model to suit the needs of a 
mobile ad-hoc network setting. The effectiveness of this model has been 
tested against its capability to reduce packet drop rate and energy 
conservation. In both of these the results show promise.  
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1. Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces the work carried out by explaining the motivation 
behind the research. The contributions made by the research work in-terms of 
research outcomes and publications out of it are also listed. A brief explanation 
of the structure of the thesis is provided at the end to present an overview of 
the content of the thesis. 
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1.1 Motivation 
Online environments, whether concerning business (like eBay, Amazon), 
gaming (like Xbox-live), or networking sites (like Facebook, Yahoo Personals) 
represent a situation where the participants are not able to negotiate face to 
face before the act of interaction.  Trust between individuals that could have 
other wise developed easily through real interactions is thus not possible in 
situations like this. At the other hand, technology is enabling more and more 
services to become online and promote a wide range of anonymous 
interactions. Social and economic exchanges in many situations put trust as a 
prior condition (Buskens, 1998, Keser, 2003).  In such situations, an interaction 
in which the level of trustworthiness of the opponent is unknown poses several 
challenges.  Lack of trust can lead to a situation where users stay away from 
technology altogether (Riegelsberger et al., 2005). To those who participate, 
absence of trustworthiness assessment systems can lead to a situation where 
the environment becomes favourable to the growth of fraudulent users posing 
as a reliable partner but defaulting at the end thus causing loss to the 
participator.  Trust is therefore central to all such transactions (Dasgupta, 
2000) and it is necessary that a suitable model be designed and built into the 
system such that it increases participation of people and cooperation between 
them at the same time.  
 
Although trust is essential, it doesn‟t come naturally in an online environment; 
right feedback and rating systems need to be applied to make participants feel 
safe (Andrews, 2006). Controlled laboratory experiments conducted by (Keser, 
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2003) suggest that reputation management systems can significantly increase 
trust among the interacting parties.    
 
There have been several attempts on modelling trust and reputation systems 
for different application scenarios like peer to peer networks(Xiong and Liu, 
2004, Zhou and Hwang, 2007, Despotovic and Aberer, 2006), multi agent 
environments(Sarvapali et al., 2004), online business sites(Josang et al., 
2007), recommender systems(Adomavicus and Tuzhilin, 2005), mobile ad-hoc 
networks(Mundinger and Boudec, 2005), to name a few.  There is however a 
gap in research that focuses on linking user behaviour with the trustworthiness 
concept. Specifically, whether the trust models that have been applied 
contribute in changing behaviours of the users to cooperative ones or not is 
the major question that remains not addressed by literature. Many of the 
existing models seem to be filtering untrustworthy users but not improving the 
overall cooperativeness by changing the user behaviour or in other words not 
being efficient enough in handling strategic users. Looking at this problem from 
the perspective of a real world situation like that of online business 
environments, a good trustworthiness system should ideally be influential 
enough to encourage cooperation by making it attractive over defection (thus 
avoiding the short term gain associated with the defaulting act) and not limiting 
itself to merely filtering possibly dishonest transactions.     
 
This research work in this regard primarily focuses on modelling 
trustworthiness assessment models based on reputation systems for online 
business game settings. Some new approaches in feedback assimilation have 
been proposed and designed.  An anonymous business game based on the 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION                                                                               4 
concept of classical prisoner‟s dilemma has been modelled to investigate the 
effectiveness of these models in promoting cooperation between the system 
users. Additionally, as an alternate application of the model, the research has 
considered modelling interaction among nodes in mobile ad-hoc network 
settings, and it is shown that trustworthiness assessment has effective role in 
reducing packet drops and saving energy.     
 
1.2 Main Contributions 
 
The major contributions of this thesis are summarised in the listings below: 
 The state of the art in Trust and Reputation Management with its   
applications to Online Market Places, Peer to Peer Networks, Multi-
Agent Environments, and mobile ad hoc Networks has been reviewed 
(Chapter 2).     
 
 A trustworthiness assessment problem has been identified and defined 
(Chapter 3). 
 
 Parameters for a trust model in the context of multi-agent environment 
have been identified and a weight based trust metric model (called 
TruMet) capable of filtering unfair ratings has been designed (Chapter 
4, Published in [5]- refer to publication list in section 1.3 for details).    
 
 A business dilemma game, based on the concept of Prisoner‟s dilemma 
has been modelled as a two player non-zero sum game. Based on this, 
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an experimental framework to asses cooperative evolution has been 
developed. (Chapter 5, Section 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4) 
 
 A method to provide incentive to cooperation and compensate loss in 
transactions has been designed and has been applied to the business 
game model to investigate its impact in the evolution of cooperation 
(Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.4; Published in [4] and [3]). 
 
 A new acquaintance based reputation model has been designed and its 
effectiveness in favouring cooperative evolution demonstrated (Chapter 
6, published in [2] revised version to appear in [1]).         
 
 A  Decision Theoretic Trustworthiness Assessment Model has been 
designed and its efficiency proved through experiments. This model 
further enhances the existing model by combining the probabilistic 
assessment part with the expected utility of each player resulting in a 
decision theoretic assessment. The assessment is guided by the 
principle of maximum expected utility, which enforces a rational player 
to choose an action only if that meets its expected utility (Chapter 7). 
 
 Finally, an application of the reputation based trustworthiness 
assessment in the context of Mobile Ad hoc networks is illustrated by 
modelling a game between a sender node and an intermediary node. 
Through experiments it is shown that having the trust model decreases 
the Packet Drop Ratio (PDR) in an ad hoc network setting. Further, the 
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results have also demonstrated that Gain through the utility and savings 
of energy is better with application of the trust model (Appendix A), 
accepted for publication in [6].       
1.3 Publications  
The work in this thesis has also been reported in the publications listed below. 
Design and conduction of the experiments and writing up of the papers were 
done by the candidate, while the co-authors of the papers have provided 
feedback on the idea, corrected the drafts, and have also presented the work 
at two different occasions.   
 
[1] S. K. Bista, K. P. Dahal, P. I. Cowling, and B. M. Tuladhar, "Acquaintance 
Based Trust Model for the Evolution of Cooperation in Business Games," 
accepted for publication in the Special Issue on Techniques and Applications 
in e-Commerce and Enterprise Computing of the Springer Journal on Service 
Oriented Computing and Applications (SOCA), 2010. 
 
[2] S. K. Bista, K. Dahal, P. Cowling, and B. M. Tuladhar, "Evolution of 
Cooperativeness in a Business Game Relying on Acquaintance Based 
Trustworthiness Assessment," in Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE Conference 
on Commerce and Enterprise Computing - Volume 00: IEEE Computer 
Society, 2009, pp16-23. 
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Paper [2] won the BEST PAPER AWARD in the conference. It was declared 
winner out of the 98 papers submitted and 21 full papers accepted for 
publication. 
 
[3] S. K. Bista, K. P. Dahal, P. I. Cowling, and B. M. Tuladhar, "Unravelling the 
Evolution of Defectors in online Business Games," in 2nd International 
Conference on Software Knowledge and Information Management 
Kathmandu:, 2008,pp 100-105 
 
[4] S. K. Bista, K. P. Dahal, and P. I. Cowling, "Evolution of Cooperation in an 
Incentive Based Business Game Environment," in Global Design to Gain a 
Competitive Edge: An Holistic and Collaborative Design Approach based on 
Computational Tools Y. Xiu-Tian, E. Benoit, and J. I. William, Eds.: Springer 
Publishing Company, Incorporated, 2008, pp. 875-882 
 
[5] S. K. Bista, K. P. Dahal, P. I. Cowling, and B. M. Tuladhar, "TruMet:an 
Approach Towards Measuring Trust in a Multi-Agent Environment," in SKIMA 
06, Chiangmai, Thailand, 2006 
 
Accepted Academic Paper (to be presented/published) 
[6] S. K. Bista, K. P. Dahal, P. I. Cowling, and A. Bouras, "Assessing 
Trustworthiness of Nodes to Enhance Performance in Mobile Ad hoc 
Networks," accepted for publication to Eighth Privacy, Security and Trust 
(PST) Conference , August 17-19 2010 Ottawa. 
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Co-Authored Academic Paper 
In the following related paper the author of this thesis was involved in creative 
input, brainstorming, and proof reading. However, the results do not form a 
part of this thesis.  
[7] P. Rupakheti and S. K. Bista, "Trust Modelling in Social Network," in 3rd 
SKIMA 2009 Fez, Morrocco, 2009. 
1.4. Structure of the Thesis  
The thesis is structured as follows: 
This chapter (Chapter 1) explains the motivation behind the work and also 
outlines the research contributions.  
 
Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature to introduce the notion of trust and 
reputation, their existing models, and some of the popular applications. We 
review the trust related problems and different solution approaches in the 
following application scenarios: Online Market Places, Peer-to-Peer Networks, 
Multi-Agent Environments, and Mobile Ad-hoc Networks, largely due to its 
popularity in these area.   
 
Chapter 3 describes the trust and reputation problem that is being considered 
for the research work. The concept of simple trust model is illustrated through 
an example of eBay feedback scoring mechanism. This chapter also explains 
the research methodology adopted.  
 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION                                                                               9 
In Chapter 4 it is aimed to describe a trust model for measuring trust between 
interacting agents. The trust model works on the basis of parameters that the 
research has identified. The model primarily analyses trust value through the 
agent‟s reputation, as provided by the agent itself, and the agent‟s aggregate 
rating as provided by the witness agents. The final computation of the trust 
value is given by a weighted average of these two components. 
 
Chapter 5 explains the evolution of cooperation in business games. It 
describes various business game models and investigates the role of incentive 
and compensation in the evolution of cooperation.   
 
In the work reported in  chapter 6 the research considers a possible 
improvement to the reputation model like that of eBay, with particular interest 
lying on investigating how the cooperativeness and population of cooperators 
would evolve if the weight of the feedback source was assigned on the basis of 
past association between players. The feedback sources are categorised as 
direct source, gray source and opposition friendly source to define an 
aggregation method for trustworthiness assessment that considers applying a 
dynamically computed weight to each source of feedback. 
 
Chapter 7 explains the Decision Theoretic Trustworthiness assessment model. 
The work in this chapter intends to further enhance the existing model by 
combining the probabilistic assessment part with the expected utility of each 
player resulting in a decision theoretic assessment.   
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Chapter 8 presents conclusion of this thesis and analyses limitations and the 
future works in the relevant area.  
 
Finally, appendix A presents an application of the reputation based trust model 
described in chapter 6 in the context of mobile ad hoc network setting. A game 
between the Sender (originator) and Intermediary nodes in the network is 
modelled and plugged-in to the existing experimental framework described in 
earlier chapters. 
 
   
 
2. Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
This chapter presents a review of the literature to introduce the notion of trust 
and reputation, their existing models, and some of the popular applications. 
We review the trust related problems and different solution approaches in the 
following application scenarios: Online Market Places, Peer-to-Peer Networks, 
Multi-Agent Environments, and Ad-hoc Mobile Networks, largely due to the 
popularity of these areas in trust research. Our attempt in this research has 
been to come up with a trust model useful to these application fronts. 
Wherever applicable we have explored state of the art of current systems and 
identified possible future research in it.   
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2.1 The Notion of Trust and Reputation 
Certainty, belief, faith, assurance, confidence, security, integrity, strength, 
ability, surety, honesty, are just among few of the words that we would use to 
say what does trust mean to us. Whether we rely or not on some object is 
guided by how trust worthy we believe it to be.  In a social context, 
trustworthiness is assessed in several ways, for example by referring to the 
past history of interaction, word-of-mouth, reliable third party certification 
(escrow services), social reputation etc (Aberer et al., 2003, Dellarocas, 2003, 
Josang et al., 2007). In our daily lives we see that trust is required everywhere 
and in every step - thus making it a crucial component of the society.  
Due to the subjective nature of trust many people would define it in many 
different ways, and further, the context sensitiveness of trust implies that the 
definition might again change with time and environment (Abdul-Rahman and 
Hailes, 2000, Gambetta, 1990, Josang et al., 2007, Whitby et al., 2005). Let‟s 
imagine a situation where a buyer intends to purchase goods from some 
anonymous online-seller. Provided that the feedback history of past 
transactions for the sellers are available- the buyer is naturally inclined to 
choose one with higher number of positive feedbacks for the reliability reason.  
But this might not always be true for some buyers who can take greater risk to 
obtain a better bargain. This just illustrates the subjectivity aspect of trust. 
Further, in a situation, like scarcity of particular goods in market, the buyer 
might not look for the same level of reliability that would otherwise be expected 
to make a decision- and this illustrates the context sensitiveness of trust.  
Another interesting aspect of Trust is its multi-disciplinary nature, due to which, 
it has gained interest of researchers from different disciplines like sociology, 
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history, economics, and philosophy besides computer science (Marsh, 1994, 
Suryanarayana and Taylor, 2004). With the emergence of online trading firms 
like eBay, Amazon and social networking sites like Facebook and MySpace, 
the problem of trustworthiness assessment today, demands knowledge of not 
only computing and mathematics, but also sociology and other behavioural 
subjects- thus making it a truly multi-disciplinary socio-technical research 
(Bhuiyan et al., 2008, Dwyer et al., 2007, Goldbeck, 2007).  
 
Computational model of trust is required to assure users of trustworthiness in 
different forms of anonymous online and social networking environments. 
However, the design of such models is not straightforward. A related concept 
to Trust known as Reputation is used as one of the common ways of 
assessing trustworthiness in such environments. Reputation mechanisms in 
recent have emerged as important component of online environments in 
eliciting cooperation within loosely coupled and geographically dispersed 
agents (Dellarocas, 2005). Online auction and business sites like eBay, Yahoo 
Auction, Amazon.com etc use simple yet effective reputation management 
frameworks to provide their users with reputation information. The success of 
these trading environments demonstrates that reputation mechanisms are an 
effective way of inferring trustworthiness in the transacting parties. However, 
with strategic players in application fronts it has become increasingly difficult to 
identify a trustworthy partner for interaction and hence the need for a robust 
system.  
 
In the area of Social Science, Organizational Behaviour and Conflict 
resolution, the importance of trust has been widely acknowledged by both 
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW                                                                      14 
scholars and practitioners, and is taken as a tool to realise cooperative 
endeavours (Mcknight and Chervany, 1996). However, literatures suggest that 
trust has not been a topic of mainstream sociology and this has hindered the 
elaboration of theoretical frameworks (Lewis and Weigert, 1985, Luhmann, 
2000). In sociological perspective, trust is taken as a property of collective 
units rather than psychological states of individuals (Lewis and Weigert, 1985). 
This perspective of trust in social science is very much inline to that in the 
online business scenario, in a sense that both deal with collective behaviour. 
Trust formulation in online business society is due to collective interactions 
and not by individuals own preference. Thus, sociological theories such as 
Social Capital Theory (Coleman, 1988) can be used to provide theoretical 
framing of the influence of social relations and networks on trust (Kuan and 
Bock, 2005).  
 
During uncertainties due to organisational crisis, trust as a central strategic 
asset is seen to be even more critical in restructuring organisations (Mcknight 
and Chervany, 1996, Mishra, 1996, Weick and Roberts, 1993). It is this use of 
trust during uncertainties in social settings that make its use sensible in online 
business settings under risk and uncertainties. In the forthcoming chapters of 
the thesis, more explorations have been made in this line.      
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2.2 Definitions of Trust and Reputation 
The compact Oxford English Dictionary (Soanes and Hawker, 2005) defines 
trust as “firm belief in the reliability, truth, ability, or strength of someone or 
something”. 
 
Deutsch (1962) Page 276, gave one of the popular definitions of trust  in which 
he writes: 
“(a) an individual is confronted with an ambiguous path, a path that 
can lead to an event perceived to be beneficial or to an event 
perceived to be harmful; (b) he perceives that the occurrence of these 
events is contingent on the behaviour of another person; and (c) he 
perceives the strength of a harmful event to be greater than the 
strength of a beneficial event. If he chooses to take an ambiguous path 
with such properties, he makes a trusting choice; else he makes a 
distrustful choice” 
An important thing in this definition is its treatment of trust as a subjective 
matter and its  dependence on individual view (Suryanarayana and Taylor, 
2004). Luhmann (1979) gives a sociological definition of trust as “a means for 
reducing the complexity of society; complexity created by interacting 
individuals with different perceptions and goals”.  
Josang et al. (2007) classifies trust definition under two notions: Reliability 
Trust and Decision Trust. To define reliability trust they use the definition of 
(Gambetta, 1990) which says “trust is the subjective probability by which an 
individual, A, expects that another individual, B, performs a given action on 
which its welfare depends”. 
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The fact that this definition considers the notion of probability makes it more 
suitable to be used in computational and mathematical models. 
To define Decision Trust (Josang et al., 2007) gave the following Mc Knight 
and Chervany inspired definition: “Trust is the extent to which one party is 
willing to depend on something or somebody in a given situation with a feeling 
of relative security, even though negative consequences are possible”. 
Grandison and Sloman(2001), define trust as “the firm belief in the 
competence of an entity to act dependably, securely, and reliably within a 
specified context”. The authors here assume that dependability covers 
reliability and timeliness. Further in this paper, the authors also define distrust 
as “the lack of firm belief in the competence of an entity to act dependably, 
securely and reliably within a specified context”. 
 For the purpose of our research we rely on the definition of Gambetta 
(Gambetta, 1990) which was given above and further build on this to suit the 
context of our work. We define trust as    
a subjective probability that a player performs in favour of all other players with 
whom it plays, such that collectively all of them obtain higher payoff and 
associated incentives for truthfulness, thus increasing cooperation and each 
other‟s reputation in the society.  
 
In our definition of Trust, we intend to introduce a new dimension by 
considering the fact that trust is a result of the contribution of cooperative acts 
of all the players in the game and such act is expected to reward the players 
with greater satisfaction and associated incentives plus a better reputation in 
the society. As we explain our Trust Model in the subsequent sections we 
establish the relevance of this definition to our model.  
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Reputation is a related concept to Trust but is also a thing not to be confused 
with it. The Oxford (Soanes and Hawker, 2005) definition of reputation is “the 
belief or opinions that are generally held about someone or something”.    
 
A player‟s reputation is related to its history of operation and is an important 
figure reflecting the possibility of success or failure (or cooperation or 
defection) in future transaction with the player. Successful online business 
models like eBay (eBay, 2007), and Yahoo Auction (Yahoo, 2007)  use this 
concept of reputation and feedback to project the possibility of a successful 
transaction with a particular subject. They adopt a simple yet successful 
centralized reputation management system.  
2.3 Categorised Review of Trust and Reputation Management Literarture 
Reputation mechanisms have grown as a powerful method of assessing 
trustworthiness of an object or individual in several application fronts such as 
online trading, peer to peer, multi-agent, Social Networks and Mobile Ad-hoc 
Network environments (Aberer et al., 2003, Buchegger and Boudec, 2005, 
Dellarocas, 2005, Mundinger and Boudec, 2005, Xiong and Liu, 2004, Yu and 
Singh, 2000). Designing Trust and Reputation models for these environments 
has been an interesting research topic in recent years. The knowledge base 
continues to grow further rapidly looking into more subtle problems in Trust 
and Reputation Management. In this sub-section we particularly focus on 
presenting different models of trust assessment and related issues in each of 
the following application fronts listed below:  
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i. Online Market Places 
ii. Peer-to-Peer Networks 
iii. Multi Agent Environments 
iv. Mobile Ad-hoc Networks 
2.3.1 Online Market Places 
In this sub-section we refer to literature concerning reputation management 
mechanisms in online market places. Our definition of online market place is a 
firm present over the Internet through which users can buy or sell their goods. 
Among the popular online market places are several Business to Business 
(B2B), Business to Consumer (B2C) and Consumer to Consumer (C2C) 
implementation of the business environments. Over the years, with the 
increasing reach of Internet throughout the globe and the popularity of global 
Internet auction environments, considerably high volumes of transactions have 
been recorded by such market places. Just eBay alone had 443.2 million 
registered users generating millions of listings worth a USD 2.02 billion of net 
revenue in the first quarter of 2009 (eBayInc, 2009). As a representative of 
such market environments we choose eBay to explore Trust and Reputation 
literature study.  
Its presence over the Internet, thus, overcoming the barrier of geography and 
the provision of maintaining anonymity of buyers and sellers has made eBay 
an attractive shopping destination – a fact very well established by the latest 
financial reports of the firm. These two characteristics however also bring 
about challenges in maintaining a trustworthy environment for its customer. It 
is always a possibility that sellers default on delivery or quality of goods, while 
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buyers default on payment- primarily because defaulting earns an immediate 
gain. In such a vulnerable situation, eBay feedback forum plays a significant 
role in providing its customers with quality service. Masclet and Penard (2008) 
have claimed eBay feedback forum to be a crucial component of the success 
of eBay.   Below we present a wide review of some interesting literature 
concerning the analysis and enhancement of the eBay-like reputation model 
mentioned above.  
 
Reputation Mechanism  
The eBay follows a binary reputation mechanism in which it collects the 
positive (+1) and negative (-1) feedbacks obtained when the buyers and 
sellers rate each other after the transaction. These feedback values are 
processed to compute the feedback score which denotes the reputation of the 
seller or buyer. It also has a provision of giving a neutral feedback (0), but this 
does not count towards the calculation of rating score. Thus, a positive 
feedback increases the score by one point, a negative feedback decreases the 
score by one point, while a neutral feedback leaves the score the same. 
Additionally the buyers and sellers can also leave a textual feedback. 
 Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 show a typical member rating profile and feedback 
respectively. Please note that the member name has been erased for privacy 
reasons. 
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Figure 2.1. A typical Feedback Score in eBay  
 
Figure 2.2. A typical Feedback note in eBay 
The important fact in the Figure 2.1 is the “positive feedback”. This is 
calculated in percentage and reflects the positive ratings left by the members. 
Unique positive ratings (1102 in the figure above) would be added to unique 
negative ratings 14 in the figure above) and then it would divide the total 
number of positive ratings(1102), thus obtaining a positive feedback of 98.7% 
above (eBay, 2007).   
 
Dellarocas (2001) describes the economic efficiency of reputation system such 
as the one used by eBay. The author describes it as a binary reputation 
mechanism in which the system accumulates all ratings into a feedback profile
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),,(    noratingR . The author further lays out properties for Well 
functioning Reputation mechanism and presents an analysis of whether binary 
reputation mechanism can be well functioning under given assumptions. The 
paper draws two important conclusions: (a) binary reputation systems can be 
well functioning provided buyers maintain a right balance between rating 
leniency and quality assessment strictness. (b) If buyers do not use the “right” 
threshold parameters while judging sellers, binary reputation system will not 
function well and the market outcome will be unfair for both the seller and 
buyer. Further in Dellarocas (2005) the author analyses design issues for an 
online reputation system under a setting with pure moral hazard. In such 
environments, sellers are assumed to be opportunistic and behave in a way to 
maximise their profit, whether by defaulting or cooperating. The paper 
concludes saying that there won‟t be a single fit-for-all sort of reputation 
mechanism design and individual designers should carefully consider their 
system requirement. As a promising future research the paper highlights two 
important areas, (a) Including other possible aspects of hazards in the system 
in-terms of different possible seller actions, and (b) considering hazards due to 
multiple simultaneous seller auctions.  
 
Dynamics of eBay Reputation System 
Empirical studies on dynamics of eBay reputation system have attracted many 
researchers. We discuss some of the interesting findings of such study in this 
section.  
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One of the interesting interrelationships in eBay is that between seller 
reputation and Pricing. It is important to note that when a buyer buys in an 
online market, he/she is not only paying for the price of the product but also for 
the service and reliability, which can be generally grouped as a set of fulfilment 
characteristics (Ghose et al., 2009). This establishes that there is an 
assessment beyond product price, and a seller‟s reputation in this regard 
becomes the first thing to be referred by buyers to convince themselves of the 
fulfilment characteristics (Ghose et al., 2009, Li, 2008).   
 
Cabral and Hortacsu (2005) conduct an empirical evaluation to understand the 
dynamics of seller reputation from eBay. They have primarily focused on seller 
behaviour and work under the assumption that buyers offer feedback in a non-
strategic way, thus identifying a future work which could consider strategic 
motives underlying various feedback behaviours. As an important conclusion 
the authors state that eBay‟s reputation system “gives way to noticeable 
strategic responses from both buyers and sellers.”   Some interesting empirical 
findings of their research is quoted here “when a seller first receives a negative 
feedback, his weekly sales rate drops from positive 7% to negative 7%; 
subsequent negative feedback ratings arrive 25% more rapidly than the first 
one. … the sellers are more likely to exit the lower his reputation is; and that just 
before exiting, sellers receive more negative feedback than their lifetime 
average”. 
 
Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) while considering empirical analysis of the 
eBay reputation system have briefly analysed whether Buyers do reward 
sellers with better reputations. They have found that good reputation of a seller 
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fetches higher probability of selling the goods in higher prices thus their 
regression analysis of effects of reputation on price and probability of sale of 
items „Rio MP3 players‟ and „Britania Beanie Babies‟ in eBay shows that the 
effects on price were indeterminate. However, more positive and less negative 
and neutral feedbacks do appear to affect the probability of sale positively for 
both the items. A randomized controlled field experiment on eBay concerning 
the sale of vintage postcards conducted by Resnick et al. (2006) reveals that 
for a seller with established identity, buyers were willing to pay higher by  8.1% 
of the selling price. These experiments also showed that a few negative 
feedbacks didn‟t affect on the buyers willingness to pay. Similarly, in a study by 
David Reiley in (Lucking-Reiley et al., 1999) concerning the sale of Gold Coins 
on eBay, it was found that a 1% increase in the seller‟s positive feedback 
ratings yields a 0.03% increase in the average auction price. As far as 
negative ratings are concerned, a 1% increase causes a 0.11% decrease in 
the average auction price. This shows that the effect of negative rating is 
statistically significant. Further, a study carried out in Houser and Wooders 
(2006) says that Seller reputation (not Buyer) has an economically and 
statistically significant effect on price. For the investigation, authors have 
considered the sale Pentium III 500 megahertz processors during the fall of 
1999 in eBay. Their result shows that a 10% increase in positive feedbacks will 
increase the winning price by 0.17%. Similarly, a 10% increase in neutral or 
negative comments will reduce the price by 0.24%. 
 
The literatures above have supported the fact that product pricings are related 
to reputation scores. However, this fact is dependent on the category of goods. 
Later, in one of our models of Trust, we relate the pricing and reputation score 
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to compute an Incentive value for cooperative act. Our choice of such design is 
rooted in the interrelationships highlighted by the review above.   
Limitations of the eBay Reputation mechanism 
Maslet and Penard (2008) perform „trust game‟ (Keser, 2003) inspired 
experimental study concerning the efficiency of the eBay feedback System. 
Their analysis further justifies the findings in (Cabral and Hortacsu, 2005) and 
says that the eBay reputation system is far from being perfect and is 
vulnerable to strategic ratings. Major part of the finding is in identifying an 
appropriate rating sequence. The authors claim that the eBay reputation 
System could be improved through a simultaneous rating system or by 
predetermining the rating sequence.     
 
In an another experimental evaluation, Chen and Hogg (2005) evaluated an 
eBay styled self reporting reputation mechanism in a double-sided exchange 
environment, were the participants were allowed to not fulfil the contract if 
wished. The results showed that the feedbacks quite accurately represented 
the transactions, and the contract fulfilment rate was also observed to be high. 
A 5% of the total inaccurate feedbacks were unfair ratings. The authors claim 
that his result is a strong evidence for the unfair ratings to be more because of 
an underlying strategy of the party than a random error.  In a significant 
number of cases this was a Tit-for-Tat strategy in effect.  
 
One of the current limitations of the online auction market‟s reputation system 
is its lack of incentive for writing truthful feedbacks or feedbacks at all. It is 
seen that only half of the time, buyers provided feedbacks on sellers on eBay 
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW                                                                      25 
and about 99% of the time they were positive(Li, 2008, Resnick and 
Zeckhauser, 2002).   In (Li, 2008) the authors have developed a model which 
rewards buyers (not necessarily financially) contingent upon buyers‟ provision 
of report. A mechanism to correct information asymmetry problem caused by 
positive feedback bias has also been introduced by the authors. The authors 
claim that their model increases unbiased reporting. This perhaps could be a 
promising line of research into the modern reputation management systems. 
Our efforts in this research will be to design a reputation system that would 
enhance the existing models by eliminating the limitations presented above.     
 
The review of literature in this domain suggests that though the reputation 
management systems like the one adopted by eBay, Yahoo auction etc are 
simple to manage and operate, they are still premature in handling strategic 
actors in the game. Strategic actors are those who would carry out a 
systematic plan of action to maximise their gain by any means and that could 
include a loss in earnings of its transaction partner. Designing reputation 
management systems that would handle such strategic players, and promote 
cooperation with minimal or no enforcement is certainly a promising future 
research area.   
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2.3.2 Peer-to-Peer Networks 
Peer-to-Peer networks are characterised by an environment that is open, 
decentralised and global at the same time. As an open system where users 
can join and leave it at anytime, it provides a strong feeling of autonomy and 
independence and thus can result in various misbehaviours (Despotovic and 
Aberer, 2006).   As the network is a truly decentralised one, there is no 
possibility of having a centralized server offering services as a trusted third 
party. This gives rise to a basic question, how does a particular peer trust on 
the services offered by another peer in the system?  
 
Despotovic and Aberer (2006) have done a very comprehensive analysis of 
the performance of two different approaches to P2P reputation management: 
namely Probabilistic estimation and Social networks. In their definition social 
networks rely on all available feedback on the network, where as probabilistic 
estimation takes into consideration a limited fraction of the feedback and 
applies to it the well known estimation techniques. Despotovic and Aberer 
draw a few interesting conclusion out of their experiment: 
 
i. Social networks cannot be applied to a diverse setting as compared to 
probabilistic estimation techniques, as they would produce unclear 
interpretation of output values. 
 
ii. If the P2P overlay used for storing reputation data is structured then the 
probabilistic estimation techniques outperform social networks in terms 
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of implementation efficiency. If the overlay is unstructured, they require 
similar costs. 
 
iii. Neither of the methods is perfect in predicting future behaviour based 
on past history for all possible behavioural patterns. Probabilistic 
estimation was found to be performing better for small fraction of 
colluding peers while, social networks gave better predictions when half 
of the peer population comprised collusive ones.  
 
The authors‟ work in this paper however assumes that all peers are live always 
whereas in reality this is a difficult thing to achieve. Further it is not certain that 
their definition of probabilistic behaviour characterises P2P networks in 
particular. This perhaps needs further investigation.  
 
Duma et al. (2005) proposes a dynamic trust metrics based on short term trust, 
long term trust and penalty factor for a peer-to-peer systems. In particular, their 
metrics detects and penalizes suddenly misbehaving peers and oscillating 
peers exhibiting occasional malicious behaviour.     
 
In Xiong and Liu (2004) the authors present a reputation based trust 
framework which relies on a transaction based feedback system. The authors 
have identified three basic trust parameters and two adaptive factors for 
computing trustworthiness of peers, namely peer feedback, total no. of 
transaction performed by a peer, credibility of feedback sources, transaction 
context factor and the community context factor. The proposed framework 
claims to have addressed the security problems in that the model allows 
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identification of reputed trustworthy peers against malicious and untrustworthy 
peers in the community. Their framework also claims to be resilient to shilling 
behaviour (in which the seller‟s friends pose as customers bidding higher to 
decoy others into participating) and group collusion among peers. Their trust 
data transmission is built on top of a mature public key cryptographic algorithm 
which contributes to better identity management in the system. However, the 
framework is still not mature enough to tackle all possible models of attack in 
the system and is also not capable of handling cases where peers discard their 
old identity to get rid of bad reputation history.  
 
Zhou and Hwang (2007) proposes a Peer-to-Peer trust model called 
PowerTrust which uses a trust overlay network (TON) to model the trust 
relationship among peers. Their construction of the overlay network is guided 
by power law distribution in the feedbacks which they obtained by observing 
over 10,000 transaction traces in the eBay. The system uses a distributed 
ranking mechanism to dynamically select a small number of most reputable 
power nodes. The authors claim is that the system significantly improves in 
global reputation accuracy and aggregation speed and is resilient to the 
dynamics of peer joining and leaving and disruptive behaviour of malicious 
peers. The authors have made a comparative analysis of their system with the 
performance of Eigen Trust System (Kamvar et al., 2003) and Peer Trust 
System (Xiong and Liu, 2004). The paper leaves trust and reputation issues 
among strategic peers and reputation system for unstructured P2P system as 
a future work.  
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Papaioannou and Stamoulis  (2006) adds a dimension to the literature by 
introducing the concept of incentive. The primary question that the authors are 
dealing with concerns how the peer reputation can be exploited such that high 
performance of peers is provided with right incentives. Authors in this paper 
have experimentally shown how a small subset of feedbacks can be used 
effectively to compute reputation values.    
 
Kamvar et al.(2003) present an Eigen Trust algorithm for reputation 
management in P2P networks. Based on the peers history of uploads, each 
peer is assigned a unique global trust value and an algorithm is described 
using this to decrease the number of downloads of inauthentic files in the 
network. A secure, distributed method is used to compute such global trust 
values. The system calculates the left principal eigenvector of a matrix of 
normalized trust values to compute the global trust. Here, global reputation of 
each ith peer is computed through the local trust values assigned to this player 
by other peers and weighted by the assigning peer‟s global reputation (Kamvar 
et al., 2003). The authors claim that their Eigen Trust system is capable of 
working efficiently under variety of malicious peer strategies.  
 
The characteristics of a P2P network like its openness, distributed nature and 
global presence makes it attractive to the users. However, a great challenge 
lies ahead as for the productive transactions within such an open and 
anonymous environment, it is essential that there should be a proper quality of 
service monitoring unit. A challenge imposed by this environment is that it 
cannot in itself have a dedicated and centralized authentication body to ensure 
trustworthiness of any pair. Thus the flexibility in this sort of environment also 
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means ample opportunities for tactful, deceptive and strategic players to cheat 
their transacting peers for a gain of maximum profit. Reputation based 
mechanism to certain extent have proved to be effective in identifying 
malicious peers in the society but however on the basis of the literature 
explored it seems that the systems are not still capable of handling tactful 
players. Further there is absence of literature addressing the finer details of 
reputation procedure which should also be considering a single reputation 
process in terms of the degree of satisfaction. However, most systems tend to 
be relying in a binary approach of reputation. Moreover, there seems to be 
ample research opportunities in modelling a system following a game theoretic 
approach. An exploration of such approaches will be detailed in later sections.  
2.3.3 Multi-Agent Environments  
Multi-agent environments represent another interesting class of problems 
where the issues pertaining to Trust and Reputation Management has serious 
concerns. In recent days, multi-agent approaches have evolved as a popular 
solution techniques to several different domains of applications such as e-
commerce, supply chain management, product life cycle management etc. In 
several of such situations, issues relating to assessment of trustworthiness 
might appear.  
 
Yu and Singh (2000) describe referral based social mechanism of reputation 
management for Electronic communities in absence of trusted third party 
(TTP). In their model the agents assist and represent principle entities in the 
electronic communities. Their social mechanism complements the hard 
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security mechanisms such as passwords and digital certificates which in their 
definition are only low hurdles to strategic players. The approach taken is that 
an agent A assigns a rating to agent B based on: (a) its direct observation of B 
as well as (b) B‟s rating by its neighbour and A‟s rating of those neighbours. 
The second aspect has made the made the approach social and enables the 
propagation of reputation data in the agent society. Their model however does 
not consider the existence of lying and strategic agents who can distort the 
reputation data in favour of their gain.  
 
 Schillio et al.(2000) establish mechanism helping agents to cope in an 
environment comprising of selfish as well as cooperative agents. The authors 
map their agent based simulation scenario to that of an electronic commerce 
environment to demonstrate the practicality of the problem and solution. A 
variation of Prisoner‟s Dilemma game called Disclosed Prisoner‟s Dilemma 
has been used. The paper also discusses on the techniques used to gather 
information from the society and transitivity issues related to trust.  
 
Huynh et al (2006) describes an open multi-agent trust and reputation model. 
Called by the name FIRE the system incorporates interaction trust, role-based 
trust, witness reputation, and certified reputation to provide trust metrics.    The 
model is empirically evaluated and shown to help agents gain better utility than 
the set benchmark in most circumstances. The authors have introduced the 
concept of third party reference called certified reputation. FIRE is claimed to 
be resilient to environmental changes in the agent society.   
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Teacy et al. (2006) presents a probabilistic trust model for a multi-agent 
environment like a virtual organization where agents might need to interact 
with strangers in the society. They use the probability based endogenous 
technique to filter contribution of possibly unfair ratings in trust computation.   
2.3.4 Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks 
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks represent another interesting area for the application 
of reputation based trust management techniques. We review literatures 
presenting issues related to trustworthiness assessment in mobile ad-hoc 
networks in this section.  
 
Concept and the Problem of Trust Assessment in MANETs 
Mobile Ad hoc networks (MANET) are complex, distributed, dynamic, self-
organizing wireless mobile nodes which can form arbitrary networks in a 
situation with no pre-existing communication infrastructure(Chlamtac et al., 
2003). Increasing popularity of light-weight devices such as handhelds, PDAs, 
cell phones, laptops etc are facilitating the ubiquitous computing vision of 
service access anytime, anywhere (Liu and Issarny, 2004). Applications of 
such networks can be seen in Collaborative Computing, Mesh Networks, 
Wireless Community Networks etc to name a few.  In such scenarios, while 
forming temporary networks, the devices might need to pair up with known or 
completely stranger ones – thus being unaware of the quality of service that 
might evolve from the collaboration. As the nodes in mobile ad hoc networks 
are routers as well as terminals, it is on the nodes themselves to assess 
whether collaboration with some particular node is desirable or not. As a part 
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of collaboration, cooperation means  finding a path for packet and forwarding it 
to others (Buchegger and Boudec, 2005). These networks are further 
characterised by a constrained bandwidth, processing and storage power and 
battery life (Azer et al., 2008). This gives a dilemma on whether to be 
cooperative by forwarding the packets or conserve ones recourses and default 
to the sender by dropping the packets. There is also a serious security concern 
in such networks. The nodes here may have inadequate protection against 
malicious attacks which could lead to capture and hijack of a node forwarding 
packets from misbehaving and malicious sources (Yan et al., 2003). As nodes 
tend to be strategic, defaulting could either be due to a merely faulty node, a 
node‟s selfishness to conserve its energy, or an act of a strategic node 
maximising its gain from the action. It thus becomes necessary to identify a 
trustworthy node for collaboration. Classical security mechanisms are 
inadequate in solving this problem which is largely due to the node‟s 
selfishness or inactivity (Michiardi and Molva, 2002b). 
 
Some Trust and Reputation Models in MANETs   
Some approaches based on reputation techniques have been shown to have 
positive impact on improving cooperation and assessing peer trustworthiness 
in MANETs. 
 
Buchegger and Boudec (2005) describe the use of a reputation based self 
policing mechanism to immunize ad-hoc networks from the presence of 
misbehaving nodes. Misbehaving nodes in the network are identified through 
reputation systems and second hand information using the deviation test. The 
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actual test of deviation done here is between second hand information and the 
node‟s reputation value. Once identified, such nodes are automatically isolated 
from the network. In an earlier work of the same authors reported in 
(Buchegger and Boudec, 2002) they have proposed a protocol called 
CONFIDANT based on selective altruism and utilitarianism  that would make 
misbehaviour unattractive  to the nodes. Routing and forwarding behaviour 
have been taken as ingredients of this model. An analysis of CONFIDANT was 
later done by Mundinger and Boudec  (2007). The authors have analysed the 
robustness of the system against liars in the network. Using a mean field 
approach to a stochastic process model, they have shown that liars have no 
impact until the number exceeds certain threshold. However, we think that, 
besides the reputation information, analysis of the behaviour of nodes is also 
necessary to complement an assessment model.  
 
An another model of reputation based technique to enforce collaboration is 
suggested by (Michiardi and Molva, 2002a). This technique uses a weight 
based approach to compute reputation by aggregating Subjective Reputation, 
Indirect Reputation and Functional Reputation.   The computed reputation 
value is used to make decision on collaboration.  The method however takes 
account of positive reputation information only. The authors say that negative 
ratings aren‟t communicated between nodes, as this information could be 
hacked by malicious nodes to decrease reputation of other nodes. We see that 
negative ratings have a value in reputation systems, specifically in identifying 
the cooperation probability of a particular node. Strategic nodes can always 
manipulate positive ratings as well. We are of the opinion that negative ratings 
should also be equally used in identifying trustworthy collaborators.  
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Theodorakopoulos and Baras (2006) have presented Semi-ring based trust 
evaluation metrics, which views the trust inference problem as a generalised 
shortest path problem on a weighted directed graph. The nodes of the graph 
represent entities and the edges represent trust relations. The major 
contribution of this paper is in proposing a method establishing trust among 
two nodes which had no previous direct interaction records.   
  
He et al. (2004) have proposed a Secure and Objective Reputation based 
incentive scheme(SORI) that claims to encourage packet forwarding and 
discipline selfish behaviour. Selfish nodes in this scheme are penalized by a 
punishment scheme which relies on probabilistically dropping packets 
originating from such nodes.  
2.3.5 Reputation System Techniques  
As it was seen from the preceding subsections of 2.3, there is a larger 
intersection of technologies applied in computing trust and reputation in the 
different application fronts that we have considered above (Online market 
Places, Peer-to-Peer networks, Multi-Agent Environments, and Mobile Ad-Hoc 
Networks). At a finer level of computation many of the works reported above 
relate closely to each other in terms of the technological approach. This 
section summarises some of the approaches which might be equally 
applicable to all three problem domains identified above. 
 
Josang and Ismail (2002) describe a reputation system called Beta reputation 
system, which as the name suggests relies on beta probability density 
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functions to combine feedbacks and derive reputation ratings. The system 
itself is flexible and simple to implement in practical applications. The system 
however relies in centralized approach and does not consider identity 
changing issues in agent society. These shortcomings are addressed by 
(Quercia et al., 2006) where the authors develop a system relying in similar 
statistical foundations but does support decentralised trust computation. The 
system is claimed to protect user anonymity while being resilient to collusive 
attacks.  
 
As a sound basis for designing reputation system (Josang and Haller, 2007) 
uses Dirichlet probability distribution as a multinomial Bayesian probability 
distribution. This allows a flexibility of defining any set of discrete rating levels 
in the system.     
 
Whitby et al. (2005) describes a design of an iterated filtering algorithm based 
on beta distribution to sort out unfair ratings in a Bayesian Reputation System. 
Their system primarily uses endogenous approach towards discounting of 
unfair ratings.  
 
Jurca and Flatings (2004) introduce an incentive friendly reputation 
mechanism. A set of broker agents called R- Agents are defined which are 
engaged in buying and selling of reputation information. Ratings are 
aggregated using simple averaging methods, and the system possesses 
shortcomings of a centralized model which makes the objectiveness of R-
agents questionable in an open multi-agent system (Huynh et al., 2006).     
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Another interesting tool that has been used in different risk analysis situation is 
fuzzy logic. Fuzzy logic as a reasoning method has logical expressions 
describing membership in fuzzy sets, and fuzzy set theory specifies how well 
an object satisfies a vague description (Russell and Norvig, 1998). Fuzzy logic 
was proposed by Lotif Zadeh (Zadeh, 1965) and ever since the theory has 
been widely used in managing uncertainties, vagueness, impreciseness and 
mimicking human decision-making process for example (Dahal et al., 2005, 
Song et al., 2005).   
 
In Song et al  (2005) the authors have presented a P2P reputation system 
based on fuzzy logic inferences and is claimed that their system can handle in 
a better way the uncertainty, fuzziness, and incomplete information in peer 
trust reports. The comparative analysis of this system is done with Eigen Trust 
(Kamvar et al., 2003) and it is demonstrated that both have comparative global 
reputation convergence time. In an another application of Fuzzy Logic, the 
authors in (Dahal et al., 2005) have developed a credit risk analysis system 
using traditional fuzzy reasoning and stage wise fuzzy reasoning. Their work 
has considered several case studies and has shown stage wise fuzzy 
reasoning to be more consistent and effective in making correct decision.   
In many situations, the problem of rating each other, whether in Peer-to-Peer 
networks, online market places, multi-agent environments, MANETs suffer 
from the problem of social dilemma. Temptation to default is always higher 
than cooperation as a default to a cooperating agent gives higher benefit than 
cooperation itself. This nature of social dilemma situation is covered by the 
prisoner‟s dilemma game (Axelrod, 1984). Prisoner‟s dilemma has been used 
extensively to study the evolution of cooperation in society (Axelrod, 1984) and 
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it resembles closely the rating game in online society (Yu and Singh, 2000). As 
a tool for performance evaluation of our model we use the concept of 
Prisoner‟s dilemma and its variations that we introduce in the subsequent 
chapters.  
2.4 Evolution of Cooperation 
The concept of Trust and Reputation is very closely related to Cooperation. 
The importance of Trust models is in its role to curb the temptation of defectors 
and promote cooperation in the society. It is however not straight forward to 
say under what circumstances should one cooperate. Humans tend to be 
cooperative if it seems that their action is likely to be reciprocated by the other 
party. In a different situation, one might defect rather when he/she sees that 
the opponent is a cooperative one. A strategic one or even just a rational one, 
interacting only one time always derives benefit from defaulting rather than 
cooperating. However none can adopt a dominant defaulting strategy as this 
erodes one‟s social reputation, thus preventing future interactions and 
potential benefit thereof.      
 
In one of the most remarkable works on the evolution of cooperation Axelrod in 
(Axelrod, 1984)  presented an optimism to cooperation by addressing 
fundamental realities of human nature. Starting from basic questions like when 
should a person be cooperative, and when selfish, his work tries to demystify 
the complexity of cooperation in humans by relating it to a Prisoner‟s dilemma 
situation. Based on Prisoner‟s dilemma again, Axelrod (1987) conducted a 
tournament of strategies in which he used Genetic Algorithms to identify a 
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fittest and an evolutionarily stable strategy. Issues relating to the evolution of 
cooperation, Trust and Reputation have been addressed by various authors in 
(Aberer et al., 2006, Janssen, 2006, Jurca and Flatings, 2004, Yu and Singh, 
2000)  and it has remained one of the interesting research topics in this area. 
Our models of trust that we have developed are based on behavioural aspects, 
related to the evolution of cooperation in general.  
 
In this research, we relate the situation in our online business environment to 
that in a Prisoner‟s Dilemma Game. Prisoner‟s dilemma like puzzle structures 
were first devised by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950, while the term 
“Prisoner‟s Dilemma” and the version with prison sentences as payoffs is 
credited to Albert Tucker (Kuhn, 2007). Further description with interesting 
cases from society was given by Axelrod in (Axelrod, 1984) and the evolution 
of strategies in an Iterated Prisoners Dilemma (IPD) environment described by 
the same author in (Axelrod, 1987).  
 
In a prisoner‟s dilemma game setting, there are two prisoners held for some 
crime and being interrogated separately. They share a dilemma as they don‟t 
get to see each other and one does not know what the other is going to say 
about the crime. Each prisoner has an option to give evidence against its 
partner by defecting him, or to cooperate by holding the evidence. (Henceforth 
we would be using the terminology Defect to mean a Defaulting act). Three 
particular situations can arise in this case: 
i. Both of them can cooperate by withholding evidence, thus the judge can 
be less certain about the crime and decide for a relatively shorter 
imprisonment (Say 1 year) 
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ii. Both of them can defect by providing evidence against each other, thus 
making it easy to reveal their involvement. In this case the judge might 
decide for a longer imprisonment for both of them (say 3 years).  
 
iii. One of them can defect while the other cooperates. In this case the 
defector might be set free while the cooperator being proven guilty 
could be given an even longer sentence (say 5 years) 
 
This situation can also be expressed in a pay off matrix as in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1Payoff Matrix for a Typical PD Game 
Prisoner B 
   Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 
C Punish A=1 yr 
 
Punish B=1 yr 
Punish A=5 yrs 
 
Punish B=0 yrs 
D Punish A=0 yrs 
 
Punish B=5 yrs 
Punish A= 3yrs 
 
Punish B=3 yrs 
 
The values for the pay off are typically called Reward for cooperation (R), 
Temptation to defect (T), Sucker‟s Payoff (S) for cooperating against a 
defecting player, and Punishment for mutual defection (P). For the dilemma to 
hold, the following condition must hold true (Axelrod, 1984): 
SPRT                                                           (2.1) 
 
This inequality ensures that cooperation is pareto optimum and that defection 
is the equilibrium play(Axelrod, 1984). In the prisoner‟s example above, these 
values correspond to the benefit that each would derive from the respective 
 P
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n
er
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actions. There is further an interesting consequence if the game is being 
played for more than one round. Typically known as Iterated Prisoner‟s 
Dilemma (IPD), in such game the pay-off for two times reward is higher than 
the summed payoff for Temptation and sucker payoff. Thus an additional 
condition given below must also hold true in this case (Axelrod, 1984) (Kuhn, 
2007). 
STR 2                                                            (2.2) 
 
The second condition ensures that full cooperation is optimal and can outclass 
swinging cooperation-defection actions in repeated games (Dawkins, 1989). 
The situation in the Iterated Prisoner‟s Dilemma is also a representative to 
online business environment (Aberer et al., 2006, Yu and Singh, 2000). If we 
consider an online trading environment where two completely anonymous 
buyer and seller are interacting, they share a dilemma on whether or not the 
other party would reciprocate its cooperation. If the seller sends the good and 
the buyer sends money worth the goods, both of them are rewarded and the 
transaction meets a happy ending. If either of them defects while the other 
cooperates, then the cooperator is badly hurt in the transaction and the 
defector scores highest (at least in the short term). If both defect each other 
then each scores a payoff better than sucker‟s score (and interestingly equal to 
reward in value as both posses the money and goods with them), but is 
nevertheless going to be a bad reference for future transaction. Further, a 
payoff for a both defect scenario cannot be considered equal to Reward, as 
there has been no transaction at all resulting in a status quo. A zero return for 
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no transaction is what the payoff in this case would be.  Ba et al. (2003) have 
considered a zero return in such scenario.  
 
A major difference this situation has with the traditional IPD tournaments is 
that, here it is not necessary for each player to play with every player in the 
society. A variation of IPD called Spatial IPD represents this scenario better. In 
spatial IPD the players are arranged in some “geographical” positions and 
most of the interactions take place between the neighbouring players (Kuhn, 
2007). Such arrangements exhibit games in clusters thus providing natural 
representation of our problem (Masuda and Aihara, 2003). As an example, in 
eBay like setting, sales items are put under several categories and each 
category has some defined sets of sellers who interact with buyers sharing 
similar interest. If we were to measure an overall evolution of cooperation, 
these individual categories of players are the source for it.   It is in this 
environment that our research focuses on investigating the evolution of 
cooperation.  
 
Aberer et al. (2006) outlines the complexity of Trust and Reputation and 
discusses different approaches to computing them. The authors have 
considered evolutionary approach as one of the many popular approaches that 
game theorists have been using.  In (Yu and Singh, 2000) the authors have 
presented a social mechanism of reputation management in electronic 
communities. In their discussion around electronic communities, the authors 
have described the Prisoner‟s dilemma situation in it. In a related work 
Janssen in (Janssen, 2006) has  studied the role of reputation scores in the 
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evolution of cooperation in online e-commerce sites. The author discusses 
whether or not reputation alone can be meaningful in evolving a cooperative 
society. The paper concludes that high level cooperation is not only possible 
with reputation scores. The author investigates the work in a one-shot 
prisoner‟s dilemma like environment. In (Jurca and Flatings, 2004), the authors 
have studied the impact of providing incentive to cooperation as a side 
payment scheme to make it rational for the agents to be cooperative.  
 
We would not use the concept of side payments described by Jurca nd 
Flattings, as it is not relevant to our experimental setting, however, we do have 
incentive model for our system described in detail in chapter 5. The proposed 
business game model in section 5.2 is described using an Iterated Prisoners‟ 
Dilemma scenario. We design and study models of business scenarios based 
on the concept of prisoner‟s dilemma to study trends in the evolution of 
cooperation. The details of these are provided in the subsequent sections.  
 
2.5 Summary and Research Gap 
This chapter reviewed literature related to trust and reputation in the context of 
online marketplaces, peer to peer systems, multi agent environments and 
mobile ad-hoc networks. Some literature presenting general trust and 
reputation model were also presented. 
 
Through the review it was seen that plenty of research has been done in the 
area of trust and reputation in application domains such as online business, 
peer to peer settings, multi-agent environments, and MANETs. Several trust 
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calculation techniques such as Peer Trust, Power Trust, and Eigen Trust were 
also seen to exist. From the other side, evolution of cooperation in different 
social dilemma settings such as that of Prisoner‟s Dilemma has also been 
studied extensively. Though the literatures have shown that trustworthiness is 
a function of past actions (behaviour) of individuals, there hasn‟t been much 
effort in linking behaviour and its evolution with the concept of trustworthiness. 
This has been identified as a gap in research and this research work 
endeavours to fill this gap. In this research work, trustworthiness will be 
studied as a function of the behaviours of subjects thus revealing the 
interesting interrelationships between the evolving behaviour of subjects in a 
social dilemma situation like that of online business settings.  
   
 
3. Chapter 3 
Problem Description 
This chapter describes the trust and reputation problem that is being 
considered for the research work. The concept of simple trust model is 
illustrated through an example of eBay feedback scoring mechanism.  Based 
on the definition of problem in this chapter more comprehensive trust model 
and evaluation frameworks are presented in the subsequent chapters. Along 
with the problem model the methodology for the investigations being carried 
out is also presented here.   
  
CHAPTER 3. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION                                                             46 
3.1 The Problem Definition and Model 
The trust and reputation management framework we are considering builds 
upon the requirements of online market places, peer-to-peer systems and 
open agent based systems. Although each of these domains of application has 
its own specific characteristics, the central idea of trustworthiness assessment 
still remains the same across them. Certain assumptions like regular 
availability of referring peers/agents would make our approach appropriate for 
many instances in these domains.     
 
To model our problem we consider online recommendation systems like that of 
eBay, which we think represents a simple and successful binary reputation 
based quality of service monitoring system in the existing online business 
systems. The problem here is to compute a trustworthiness value (say T) given 
the following information: 
 
 total number of positive feedback (Vp) representing a (+1) received by 
the player up to this point in its lifetime  (the term player would be used 
to describe the buyer as well as seller in an eBay like setting) 
 
 total number of negative feedback (Vn) representing a (-1) received by 
the player up to this point in its life time 
 
 total number of neutral feedback (Vu)  representing a (0) received by the 
player up to this point in its life time.  
CHAPTER 3. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION                                                             47 
 
Based on these values available (but not including the neutral feedbacks (Vu)) 
eBay currently calculates a player Rating as follows: 
 
Say a player ABC1234 has a total of 4746 unique positive feedbacks (Vp) and 
a total of 9 unique negative feedbacks (Vn) in the past 12 months. The positive 
feedback value expressed in percentage is obtained as: 
 
%8.99100
94746
4746
100






vv
v
NP
P
FeedbackPositive
 
This means that in 99.8% of the total transactions, this player has received a 
positive feedback. It also gives a Feedback score to each member 
representing the total score rating and is used to assign various star rating to 
the player.  
 
In addition to these data eBay also gives a one month, six months and twelve 
months r history of positive, negative and neutral feedbacks. Further, eBay 
also provides categorised star rating in a scale of 1-5 stars under the following 
criteria: 
i. Items as described 
ii. Communication 
iii. Dispatch time 
iv. Postage and Packaging charges 
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An interesting data in eBay‟s player history is that the total number of 
feedbacks that have been withdrawn mutually by the players. This data does 
not contribute to reputation computation, however is a very sensitive piece of 
information as no players would withdraw positive vote. This information is 
meaningful as a player‟s local rating will not contain this information, however, 
a search through the players social network should be able to reveal this. This 
highlights the importance of a feedback from recommenders in addition to the 
players own version of its rating.    
 
The conceptualisation of our model builds upon the analysis of eBay‟s current 
reputation mechanism. In particular we start our work with the following 
questions: 
 
i. Should the parameters contributing to the computation of the 
trustworthiness factor of a player be weighed according to its 
importance? 
 
ii. Are there any additional parameters that would facilitate in better 
assessment of a players reputation? 
 
iii. What happens if the players lie while providing feedbacks? Can there 
be mechanisms to filter the contribution of dishonest feedbacks? 
 
iv. The current model of eBay‟s reputation system provides plenty of 
information for interpretation by users. Can this information be 
processed correctly to compute a single value (besides the feedback 
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score) which would help user‟s to asses the trustworthiness at a 
glance? 
 
To answer on the possibility we conceptualise our model which is explained in 
following chapters. We have used the prisoner‟s dilemma based business 
game simulation models to illustrate the usefulness of trust models by 
assessing its contribution in evolving cooperative player behaviour in the 
trading society.  
3.2 The Research Methodology 
The research problem outlined in section 3.1 concerns investigating the past 
actions of users in online trading scenarios. Such past actions include the 
history of cooperation and defection in all of the past transactions by a 
particular user. An equivalent of this would be the public feedback profile of 
buyers and sellers available on eBay. However, a large set of data for analysis 
is required and manually retrieving cooperation information from feedback 
profile like that of eBay would be a next to impossible task. No other sources of 
such information would fulfil the requirement either, and moreover, business 
sites would not handover such critical customer information- unless they were 
doing the research themselves.  In this context, there was a need to have a 
realistic simulation model that would produce data for analysis and at the same 
time exploit the data generated to study the evolution of cooperation.  
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Thus, to carry out the research, an experimental model was designed and all 
the different experiments were carried out using this model. Chapter 5, section 
5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 explain in detail the design of the experimental model.    
 
A trustworthiness assessment model for further experiments was designed 
and its effectiveness was tested using the model developed in Chapter 5. The 
detail of the trust model and the method of investigation are furnished in 
section 6.2 and 6.3 of chapter 6.  
 
Further extension to the existing experimental model was done to enable 
decision theoretic capabilities. Concepts of utility theory were used to enhance 
the existing model. This has been detailed in section 7.3 along with the 
investigation method in 7.4.  
 
The experimental model has also been adapted to suit the needs of mobile ad-
hoc network scenario. The design of the model is presented in Annex I.    
 
In each of the chapters mentioned above, designs of the experiments along 
with its objective have been clarified.  Results of the experiments have been 
analysed and conclusion drawn.  
   
 
4. Chapter 4   
TruMet: A Trust Metric Model 
One of the risks involved in multi agent community is in the identification of 
trustworthy (and especially untrustworthy) agents for interaction. In this section 
of the thesis, we aim to describe a trust model for measuring trust between the 
interacting agents. The trust model works on the basis of parameters that we 
have identified. The model primarily analyses trust value through the agent‟s 
reputation, as provided by the agent itself, and the agent‟s aggregate rating as 
provided by the witness agents. The final computation of the trust value is 
given by a weighted average of these two components.  While computing the 
aggregate rating, a weight based method has been adopted to discount the 
contribution of possibly unfair ratings by the witness agents.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Reputation based assessment of trustworthiness or reliability of objects (which 
includes people or agents) in virtual community has gained significant interest 
of the researchers in the recent. Reputation systems have shown to be 
effective in several application fronts which include online e-commerce 
systems, Economics, Scientometrics (bibliometrics), sociology, evolutionary 
biology, Multi-Agents System, online news systems, virtual organizations 
etc.(Abdul-Rahman and Hailes, 2000, Collins, 2009, Mui et al., 2002, Teacy et 
al., 2006). Popular use of reputation based quality assurance system can be 
seen in eBay, Amazon etc. Similarly, the news site Slashdot 
(http://slashdot.org) has introduced the concept of awarding Karma scores as 
a sum of one‟s activity (includes posting, moderation, and story submissions) 
on Slashdot - which is similar to the concept of assessing ones trustworthiness 
from reputation information(Taco, 2003). In an another attempt of presenting 
trustworthiness information, Epinions.com (http://www.epinions.com/) a 
shopping.com company owned by eBay Inc allows members to rate a product 
and write review on the product, which can further be evaluated by users on 
the basis of its usefulness to them (Shopping.comInc, 2009).   
 
Many different types of computer systems, such as the grid, semantic web, 
pervasive computing systems and peer-to-peer systems can be viewed as 
multi- agent systems, where individual components are autonomous entities 
performing in an open network- meaning that they can join and leave the 
network anytime (Huynh et al., 2006). This open characteristic poses a trust 
assessment challenge as the individuals might only have limited knowledge on 
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the peers and the associated environment in this partially observable, dynamic 
and unpredictable situation. In multi-agent systems, the agents are deployed in 
a situation where they do not only interact with each other but also compete 
and cooperate with others having possibly conflicting goals (Sabater-Mir, 
2003).  Thus the problem of trustworthiness assessment in agent society 
needs a different approach to aggregation and computation of trust as 
compared to traditional centralised systems like that of eBay (Gutowska and 
Bechkoum, 2007).   
 
Trust measurement techniques based on statistical approaches have been 
popular in estimating the opponent‟s reliability, for example the works in 
(Despotovic and Aberer, 2006, Josang and Ismail, 2002, Kamvar et al., 2003, 
Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994, Shi et al., 2004). Many of these techniques 
rely on probabilistic estimation to compute a trustworthiness range, which in 
fact is complex to understand and hard for general interpretation(Whitby et al., 
2005). We propose a simple trust metrics called, TruMet, which relies on 
calculating a real numbered value in the range [0,1]- representing a 
trustworthiness factor for multi-agent interactions. It also tackles the problem of 
unfair ratings by using exogenous filtering method. We believe that the 
computed value is easy to interpret and at the same time reliable due to the 
robustness of the model.         
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4.2 The TruMet model  
We first outline the parameters we would be relying on to measure trust in a 
multi-agent environment. The choice of these parameters have been guided by 
the utility of the reputation scores as in (eBay, 2007) and some approaches 
towards trust metrics in P2P environments as in (Xiong and Liu, 2004). We 
assume an agent based online trading scenario, where agents search and 
chose a particular peer to transact by referring basically to the trustworthiness 
value computed by a Trust Model. The fundamental building block of the trust 
model is the reputation information that each agent maintains. An agent 
maintains reputation information of all other peers with which it has interacted 
in the past by simply storing the total successful transactions (Positive 
experience) and the total number of transactions. It is mandatory in this setting 
to rate each other positively or negatively after each transaction. In addition to 
its own experiences from the past, an agent also has an option of gathering 
feedback from the referring community in the agent society.  It is however not 
necessary that an agent always replies truthfully. In a binary reputation 
system, an untruthful reply means an opposite of the truth. If the reply system 
works on some scale, untruthfulness could also mean some deviation from the 
truth.   The following parameters, listed and detailed below, summarise the 
characteristics of the Trust Model in the scenario explained above:  
 
i. Direct Positive Rating Score: This score represents the direct 
experiences between two agents. After each transaction, corresponding 
agents express their satisfaction or dissatisfaction by rating the other agent 
positively or negatively. A positive rating increases the total count of positive 
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interactions by a single unit, while a negative rating increases that of negative 
interactions. Either of them increases the total transaction count by a single 
unit. We define a Direct Positive Rating Score as a ratio of the sum of Positive 
ratings to that of the total transactions.  
Let Rp represent a positive rating, and Rn a negative rating, then the Direct 
positive rating score (RSP) is given by: 




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p
p
RR
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 (4. 1) 
In other words this ratio gives the probability of positive action in the 
forthcoming transaction with the particular agent, for example like that in eBay, 
Amazon etc.    
 
ii. Aggregate Rating: In addition to the first agent‟s direct experience in 
dealing, it might also like to listen to what the community says on the 
truthfulness of the second agent. It can also be that the second agent‟s 
interaction with the first agent is for the first time; hence the first agent lacking 
knowledge on second party will now have to find this out through a community 
referral network. The agents forwarding reports of the second agent would be 
called witness agents in this case. The ratings forwarded by all the witness 
agents will be aggregated to compute the societies‟ opinion on the second 
agent‟s truthfulness. 
 
The rating aggregation in our model is realised through a referral network 
which is constructed dynamically upon agent (Pa) seeking reputation 
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information of another agent (Px) in the society. Figure 4.1 presents an 
example of a referral network. 
Witness 
W2AX
Player A Player X
Witness 
WnAX
Witness 
W1AX
W1X[S,U]
W2X [S,U]
WnX [S,U]
 
Figure 4.1. Witness Agents in a referral network providing X‟s rating to A 
The rating from each witness agent on agent X‟s history (RWX) is expressed as 
a vector consisting of the total number of successful(S) and unsuccessful (U) 
transactions in the past. Thus, ],[ USRWx   where 0,0  US    
Aggregation of rating is obtained by a simple vector addition. If (W, X) is the 
pair of players, aggregate rating )(xRw  highlighting w‟s overall opinion of X is 
obtained as: 

x
w RxR )(  
(4.2) 
The ratings collected from the society represent binary events, containing a 
report of the positive and the negative transactions between the agents in the 
past. The model being distributed in nature, propagation of the values in this 
case follow a decentralised approach, in which the agents themselves 
maintain the reputation information of others with whom they have interacted in 
the past  and can share it across when queried.  
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Dempster-Shafer Theory (Dempster, 1968), and Beta Distribution Functions 
(Weisstein, 2009a) represent two popular mathematical approaches in 
modelling reputation systems. Also known as theory of belief functions the 
Dempster-Shafer theory is a generalisation of the Bayesian theory of 
subjective probability(Shafer, 1990). Bin Yu and Munindar Singh‟s work  (Bin 
and Munindar, 2003) is a representative example of the use of Dempster-
Shafer Theory in reputation modelling.  Works in (Buchegger and Boudec, 
2004), (Josang and Ismail, 2002) and (Patel et al., 2005), have used Beta 
Distribution to represent probability distribution of binary events to model a 
reputation system. Beta Reputation Systems are known to provide richer 
representation of uncertainties as compared to Dempster-Shafer Theory 
(Regan et al., 2005).  
 
Our approach of inferring probability of trustworthiness from the rating data (as 
aggregated through equation 4.2) is by the use of Beta Probability Distribution 
functions (Weisstein, 2009a) like in (Josang and Ismail, 2002). f(p|α,β) can be 
expressed using the gamma function Γ (Weisstein, 2010) as: 
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With a condition that p ≠ 0 if α < 1, and p≠1 if β<1, the probability expectation 
value of beta distribution is given by: 
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


pE                                                                                (4.4) 
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When nothing is known (α=β=1), the a priori distribution is the uniform beta 
distribution. After some number of observations of α and β the a posteriori 
distribution is the beta PDF based on the α, β value. Typical beta plots for 
observation of some values of α and β are given in  
Figure 4.2. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Example of typical beta plots for the random variables in the X-axes and 
Probability density on the Y-axes for the given values of α and β 
The α, β value here are in relation to the number of successful (S) and 
unsuccessful (U) transactions in our case. After observation of 1 successful (S) 
and 4 unsuccessful (U) transactions the α=S+1=2, and β=U+1=5.  
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Random Variables along X-axes 
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According to equation (4.4) the probability expectation value with α=2, β=5 is 
0.28, meaning that the relative frequency of the out come of successful 
transaction S is very low and uncertain and the value is 0.28. 
 
Applying equation (4.4) to (4.2) a simple point estimate of X‟s probability 
distribution is given by the expectation value of the beta distribution as:  
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(4.5) 
 
There is however a serious issue here in this computation. The agents by 
nature are autonomous, meaning that they themselves decide on what action 
to take, and that there is no central policy which binds their action. This means 
that there is every possibility that the agents would forward an untruthful 
evidence of their experiences. Thus, it becomes necessary to compute the 
aggregate community rating with an inbuilt filtering mechanism to discount 
unfair/dishonest ratings from the society. This problem of witness agent lying is 
dealt by the next parameter called truth telling probability, explained below.    
 
 
iii. Truth Telling probability (theta) 
When we consider a society comprised of rational agents, we need to consider 
the fact that each of these agents would work towards maximising their profits 
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even at the cost of other‟s profit. The witness agent telling truth on the 
performance of another agent might also suffer from this. Some witness might 
offer an unfairly positive rating, while others might forward negative depending 
upon which one would keep them in a good shape. It is thus necessary to have 
a filtering algorithm implemented such that any possible biased opinions are 
filtered. As mentioned in Whitby et al. (2005) there are two possible techniques 
applied in filtering such ratings: 
 
a. Endogenous discounting of unfair ratings:  In which the statistical 
properties of the ratings are analysed to reveal ratings which are beyond 
an average range. 
 
b. Exogenous discounting of unfair ratings: In which the ratings are rated 
according to the reputation of rating party.  
 
In our model we follow the exogenous approach of filtering possibly unfair 
rating, in which we calculate a truth telling probability (θ) of the witness agents. 
This value is applied to the feedback provided by the witness agent as 
described below.  
(4.6)




US
S
ww
w
                                                                                                                            
Where, Ws and Wu represent the total number of successful and unsuccessful 
transactions recorded by witness players respectively.  Of course this 
information is difficult to obtain, as the agents might not necessarily keep it 
public. It is our assumption that the agents do not lie in telling their own 
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credibility, and that such an assumption is justified because in many cases 
(like in eBay) feedbacks are available for public reference.  
If a witness Wi with a transaction history of Sw successful transactions and Uw 
unsuccessful transactions sends in a vector rating )(xRwi on agent X‟s rating, 
then the actual report on X‟s probability as a factor of  Wi „s own probability of 
telling truth is given by: 
)(*)'( xRxR wiwi                                              (4.7) 
                                                                                                                             
Where the value of )(xRand wi is calculated as given in equation (4.6) and 
(4.5) respectively. We would workout through an example to make this further 
clear shortly.  
 
iv. Weight factor: The next important parameter of our model is the weight 
factor. It might sometime be desirable by an agent to give higher priority to its 
own version than the community report or Vice-versa.  If an agent thinks that 
its own rating is sufficient enough to count on the trustworthiness of the other 
agent, then it can simply ignore the community feedback, or give a very low 
weight to the aggregated rating score from the community. To facilitate such 
operations we introduce a weight factor called as impact (I) to each of the 
Direct and Community component such that: 
 
CommunityDirect III 
  where 
10
,10
,10



Ibut
I
I
Community
Direct
                                           (4.8)
 
With these parameters a utility based trust factor TAX as a trust of Agent A on 
Agent X can be defined mathematically. Our model relies on self experience 
CHAPTER 4. TRUMET: A TRUST METRIC MODEL                                           62 
and community rating to compute an aggregate trust value.  Similar approach 
of aggregation has been used in (Xiong and Liu, 2004) for trust aggregation in 
a Peer-to-Peer network , but we have a different set of parameters (specific to 
this model) in our case. Thus, TAX can be defined as: 
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         (4.9) 
Where, 10  AXT   
The equation 4.9 computes trust based on two components, the first one 
computes a direct trust and the second one computes community rating. As 
seen in the equation above, the community rating is further subject to 
adjustment via agent‟s truth telling probability. Finally, both of these 
subcomponents are subject to weighing through the direct and community 
weight factor. The subcomponents are computed as per the explanation in 
equation 4.4 and 4.5, where as the truth telling probability for community rating 
aggregation is derived from equation 4.6.  Later in this chapter, during the 
experimentation, we formulate an algorithm to dynamically adjust the weights 
to each of these components. In the next section we workout through a sample 
example to illustrate how the trust model established in equation 4.9 computes 
a numerical trust value.     
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4.3 Trust Metric Example 
This example concerns explaining the performance of the conceptual trust 
model established in section 4.2 above. We assume some values to the 
variables and formulate some typical cases to explain the results. Though the 
assumption list below contains some specific figures, the values in themselves 
are just guesses to work through an example and there is no significance or 
relevance of it in any particular scenario. However, care has been taken to 
ensure that the values are diverse in themselves. In later parts of this thesis, 
we will use this trust model in social dilemma situations and use values 
representing a particular social dilemma game.    
      
Suppose that an agent PA likes to know how much trust worthy another agent 
PX is for a transaction. We assume the following details on PX available to PA: 
i. Let the number of positive transactions (Rp) that PA has had with Px in 
the past be, say, 500 and that of negative transactions (Rn) be 30. 
 
ii. Let there be five other agents (PQ, PR, PS, PT, PU) who provide 
references to PA on the quality of transaction they have experienced 
with Px before (in terms of the total number of Successful (S) and 
unsuccessful (U) transactions). Let us assume that the references take 
the following values: PQ=[S=10, U=1], PR=[S=800, U=1], PS=[S=50, 
U=50], PT=[S=60, U=500], PU=[S=200, U=0]). Further, let the referring 
players have the following information on their own past transaction 
history: RPQ=[S=100, U=10], RPR=[S=10000, U=500], RPS=[S=70, 
U=70], RPT=[S=1000, U=30], RPU=[S=201, U=50].  
CHAPTER 4. TRUMET: A TRUST METRIC MODEL                                           64 
 
iii. To represent a situation in which an agent gives equal weight to his 
own belief (Direct Rating) and social belief (Community Rating) we 
choose 15.05.0  CommunityDirect III   
 
We apply these values to equation (4.9) to obtain trustworthiness of PX for PA.  
As we have more than one witness providing the reference on PX the 
aggregation on the equation above needs to be redefined. The equation now 
takes the form as given below:  
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(4.10) 
Inserting the values from the assumption list above: 
 
78.0
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)62.05.0()94.05.0(
66.094.05.0
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The figure 78.0AXT  obtained through the calculation above has a very simple 
and useful meaning. Provided that Agent A has some threshold which guides it 
on whether to go for an interaction or not, this value for TAX can be checked 
against it and a decision be made on whether to go for an interaction or not.   
Figure 4.3 presents a comparative graphical representation of the individual 
components of calculation.   
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Figure 4.3. Trust calculation and component wise distribution using equation (4.9) 
Agent A in the example above has relied equally on its own experience as well 
as on the experience gathered from the community. The value for direct rating 
being greater than that of community rating implies that agent X has been 
more cooperative to agent A than it has been to others in general in the 
society. Many of the times agents might decide to give higher value to their 
own experience over the feedback obtained from others in the society. In such 
case, the weight associated with direct rating can be made higher at the cost of 
the weight to community rating (as per the rule in equation 4.8). In case when 
the agent is not known to its counterpart through past history, it will have to rely 
totally on the ratings from the society, which again can be achieved by tuning 
the weight parameters.   
 
An interesting aspect to analyse in this result is the impact of the truth telling 
probability of the witness agents in their feedback report. Table 4.1 analyses 
the data for the values from the example above:  
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Table 4.1 Analysing the impact of truth telling probability upon adjusted reputation 
 
Agent history refers to the record of the total number of successful(S) and 
unsuccessful (U) transactions the witness agent has recorded in the past. 
Agent X‟s report is the experience in terms of successful and unsuccessful 
transactions that each of PQ, PR, PS, PT, and PU has experienced in the past 
with Agent X. Truth telling probability is computed as per equation 4.6 and 
represents the value by which the report of a player can be relied upon. This 
value is applied to reported reputation score of a player to minimize the impact 
of any possible dishonest report. Its worth recalling here that exogenous 
method of filtering assumes a report to be reliable only to the extent of the 
reporters own credibility. The final value is thus computed by adjusting the 
report through the truth telling probability of the witness. The graph in Figure 
4.4 provides a representation of values in the Table 4.1. It illustrates the impact 
with which Agent X‟s reputation has been adjusted with the truth telling 
probability factor. It can be clearly observed that feedback from agents with 
high truth telling probability are diminished less as compared to the ones which 
Agent 
Agent 
History 
Report 
on Agent 
X 
Truth 
telling 
Probability 
Agent X's 
Reputation 
Agent X's 
Adjusted 
Reputation 
 S U S U  
PQ 100 10 10 1 0.909091 0.909091 0.826446 
PR 10000 500 800 1 0.952381 0.998752 0.951192 
PS 70 70 50 50 0.5 0.5 0.25 
PT 1000 30 60 500 0.970874 0.107143 0.104022 
PU 201 50 200 0 0.800797 1 0.800797 
 
Table 5.2 Adjusted Reputation Calculations 
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have low truth telling probability. This shows that the weighted approach has 
been effective in its application of exogenous filter.  
 
 
Figure 4.4. Impact of Truth probability on the feedback report  
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4.4 Trust Metric Experiment 
To study functionality of the trust metrics established, we conduct an 
experiment in which we simulate performance of the trust model in a multi-
agent type of environment. The primary aim of this experiment is to study the 
contribution of the trust model we have established in identifying the 
trustworthiness of other agents in the society and avoiding them for 
transactions if necessary.  
4.4.1 The Experimental Setting 
We take a population of 100 agents situated in a two dimensional plane with 
identified edges (or equivalently a torus). Each of the 100 agents have an all 
together eight neighbours to interact by playing some sort of a symbolic 
cooperation-defection game with each other. Each of the agents adopts an 
alternately defaulting behaviour meaning that an agent X alternately 
cooperates and defaults during its interactions. It is however, not specified with 
whom to cooperate or default. Generation as well as allocation of strategies at 
this stage is purely random. In later chapters we discuss more advanced 
player strategies, but for now to demonstrate the utility of the trust model we 
limit our models of strategies.  
 
Any agent X utilizes the trust model we established to perceive the probability 
of cooperation from the other agent.  The following applies to the agents in 
question: 
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i. Each agent would be allowed to interact with eight of its surrounding 
neighbours in the plane for a maximum of 100 times with each. The result of 
interaction would be either cooperation or defection to its partner by the agent.  
ii. The past history of interaction is referred by each agent in computing the 
trustworthiness of the other that it is considering for an interaction.   
 
iii. The agent would first compute the Direct Positive Score by referring to its 
own past records, and then would pose a query to the community to find out an 
aggregate community rating.  
 
iv. In the current setting, the weight for Direct Rating is identified first. 
Community rating weight is then calculated by using equation (4.8). We 
assume that Direct ratings are useful for reference to the extent the quality of 
experience in the past has been. We thus assign the direct rating score itself 
as a weight to the direct rating component. This intuitive assignment is also for 
the simplicity reason.      
 
v. The process of computation of the trust value is as explained in section 
4.2 and illustrated in 4.3. All the agents initially start from a zero pre-
transaction history and build up reputation through interactions in the society, 
but the agents aren‟t designed to be aware of the dynamics of reputation.   
 
vi. There is no trustworthiness threshold set between agents to decide 
whether to interact or not. The values are generated purely for the purpose of 
explaining the working methodology of the trust model and to suggest how this 
model can be used in a multi-agent setting as described above.  
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4.4.2 Results and Analysis 
In this section we present results on the computation of two parameters of the 
trust model, namely the Direct Positive Rating Score, and the aggregate 
community rating score. Their relationship to the actual trustworthiness value 
is also discussed.  We also present analysis of these results.   
 
To produce the results, we picked an agent at random and analysed all of its 
800 instances of the trustworthiness query of its neighbours. Before picking the 
agent, we took a reading of rating scores of all the agents and obtained a 
standard deviation of their truth reports to be 0.21. Given that the deviation 
was not that significant, we confined our analysis to a single agent‟s data.  
 
Firstly we noted the range of values for the Direct Positive rating score as well 
as Aggregate Community Rating Score for all 800 instances. An average of 
0.49 for Direct Positive Rating and 0.50 for Aggregate Community Rating was 
observed. In this setting where we haven‟t introduced any lying agents, the 
comparable results suggest that the community rating and self rating are 
consistent.  
 
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 present scatter plots for the range of values taken by 
Direct Positive Rating Score and the Aggregate Community Rating Score.  
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Figure 4.5. Scatter plot for Direct Positive Rating (DPR) Score 
  
Figure 4.6. Scatter plot for aggregate Community Rating (ACR) Score 
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Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 analyse the impact of each component in the 
trustworthiness computation and thus describe their relationship to it.  
 
 
Figure 4.7. DPR‟s Contribution in the final Trustworthiness value 
 
Figure 4.8. ACR‟s Contribution in the final Trustworthiness value 
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community has been more consistent in dealing to other agents than the 
subject agent (the agent being considered for analysis). Both of the trends 
here are however more or less comparable. This is primarily because the 
current experimental model lacks lying agents. Introduction of such agents will 
be made in subsequent chapters and their impact on the final trustworthiness 
computation will be discussed.   
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter we conceptualised trust metric for multi-agent environment. We 
believe that the real value computed by algorithm like ours is more realistic, as 
compared to existing feedbacks in online business settings like eBay, where 
there is no provision of weighing feedbacks depending upon their sources. The 
automation of feedback computation in online business environments is 
possible by the use of agent based approaches, and that our trust metrics can 
be instrumental in computing agent trust in such environments. Through the 
experiment above, we demonstrated how trustworthiness could be computed 
in multi-agent sort of environment. Several variations of these settings are 
possible, and each variation can lead to results with several interesting facts. 
One of such variations is the strategy which the agent adopts to play the 
cooperation-defection game. In our setting we have taken a balanced strategy, 
which was for the simplicity reason, as in this section we just demonstrate the 
working principle of the trust model. A variation in strategy can give a diverse 
result for the Direct Positive rating and the Community Rating. We deal with 
such problems in the subsequent chapters.    
    
   
 
5. Chapter 5 
Evolution of Cooperation in 
Business Games 
Online business environments have a social dilemma situation in it - a dilemma 
on whether to cooperate or default its opponent. Defection by a buyer to seller 
and/or seller to buyer might give each a better profit at the cost of the loss of 
other. However, if these parties were to interact in future too, a bad past 
reference might prevent cooperative actions in future, thus depriving each 
other from a better gain. Moreover, a bad reputation might be considered as a 
good reason for not to interact by the other party.  The anonymity of the 
players and absence of a central governing body make this environment 
tempting for the defaulters. What might be the evolutionary behaviour of 
defectors in such environment? How could their increasing population be 
controlled? It is these two questions basically that we attempt to address in this 
section of the research work.  
A genetic algorithm based spatial iterated prisoner‟s dilemma (SIPD) 
environment has been used to simulate the experiments. We consider two 
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different cases for our investigation: In the first case, we consider providing 
compensation to the victims of defaulters and study its impact on the evolution 
of cooperators and defaulters. Secondly, role of an incentive based setting in 
increasing cooperative population is analysed. Players in this setting are 
rewarded for being cooperative to their counterparts. 
 
Our results show that incentive based methods are useful in increasing the 
population of the cooperators in the society, while the compensation scheme is 
seen to be useful in decreasing the population of the defector‟s (specifically top 
defectors) in the society. However, interpretations of the results show that 
purely incentive and compensation schemes are not enough to make a 
significant contribution in building a trustworthy interaction environment. These 
findings have been reported in publications [3] and [4] listed in section 1.3 of 
this thesis. In the subsequent chapters we describe additional methods to 
promote cooperation in the society.  
   
  
CHAPTER 5. EVOLUTION OF CCOPERATION IN BUSINESS GAMES             76 
5.1 Introduction 
Businesses are typically characterised by a motive to maximise profit. To a 
seller, maximization of profit allows greater benefit and also serves its 
sustainable growth in a competitive market environment. Similarly, a buyer 
would also look for a suitable bargain in the cost price to maximise its gain. 
When a cooperative seller interacts with a cooperative buyer, both of the 
players (we would use this term player to denote a buyer or seller in general) 
would end up in a happy transaction. The seller makes its profit while the 
buyer gets the goods at an acceptable price, thus making the transaction 
beneficial to both of them. In a setting where they are dealing in a credit 
transaction, if one of them turns out to be selfish, the co-operator is deceived, 
while the selfish one benefits the most.  In such an environment, any rational 
player finds incentives for its selfishness and also enjoys a lesser risk over 
cooperation which might lead to its defeat in case the other player defects. 
Thankfully, in the real world, this situation is eased by the presence of 
governing bodies and also (arguably) by human tendency towards altruism 
and sustainability.  Further, selfish behaviour of a player can be at the cost of 
its credibility which is an important thing for a player to maintain in order to 
ensure renewed interest of the other party (and its references) in future 
transactions. Cooperation however might not be an easy thing to achieve in an 
online business environment (generalised term for electronic markets) where 
anonymity of a player might aid in making the situation manipulable by the 
strategic ones. The types of environments that we consider here are typically 
characterised by the lack of a central governing body which would verify the 
identity of the players and maintain „a law and order situation‟ in it. Today‟s 
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popular e-Business sites like eBay and the Peer to Peer networks in their 
extreme form can be an example of this type of environment. EBay maintains 
centrally the data of its members and lists their credibility by providing publicly 
their reputation information (eBay, 2007). These information to certain extent, 
help the player in perceiving security in transaction, but still in absence of 
physical security, strategic players can earn higher payoff (in the short term) 
for their selfish and deceptive act. How then would cooperation evolve in 
online business scenario? It is this interesting aspect of cooperation evolution 
that we are investigating through our experiments.  In this paper, we report the 
outcomes of our investigation into how and under what conditions cooperation 
might evolve in an online business environment which lacks a central 
governing body. 
The remaining part of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 
presents the details of the business game models; Section 5.3, 5.4 explains 
and presents the experimental results and analysis. Summary of the Chapter 
is given in Section 5.5. 
5.2 Business Game Models 
This section introduces and explains the concept of business games through 
game models. The concept of the business game models are based on that of 
Prisoner‟s Dilemma in section 2.4.  In addition to a regular business game 
model, we have also modelled and explained a compensating and an incentive 
based setting. Our rational behind the design of these two models is to deeply 
understand the role of incentive and compensation in increasing 
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cooperativeness among the players. The concept of compensation to buyers 
under buyer protection program in eBay through PayPal is a popular example 
of loss compensation schemes. An approach towards increasing cooperation 
through the means of incentives in a multi-agent setting is discussed in (Jurca 
and Flatings, 2004). Here, we do not implement the incentive concept of Jurca 
and flattings but try to see through our own incentive model how good 
incentives are in promoting cooperation. We would specifically like to analyse 
whether these two business models are sufficiently strong enough to curb on 
the defaulters. If not to what extent are they important and reliable?  
 
The anonymous business game between two players, a buyer and a seller 
described in the section 5.2 can also be expressed in terms of a payoff matrix 
as in Table 5.1. Let γ be the price of goods that is being purchased by a buyer 
from some seller. The amount of money the buyer has to pay to the seller is 
the price of the goods, thus in this case this also equals γ in value. The gains 
of these two players in four different possible action sequences are 
summarised by the matrix in Table 5.1: 
 
Table 5.1 Payoff Matrix for a Typical Business Game 
Buyer 
 Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 
C Rseller= γ  
Rbuyer= γ 
Sseller =  - γ 
Tbuyer = 2 γ 
D Tseller = 2 γ 
Sbuyer = - γ 
Pseller = 0 
Pbuyer = 0 
 
The notations T, R, P and S have the same meaning as in equation (2.1). The 
relationships between the values here are still conformant to the inequalities in 
(2.1) and (2.2). Thus this situation imposes a Strong Dilemma in the players.   
 S
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5.2.1 Compensating Business Game  
Another typical business game is an eBay like scenario. We take eBay as a 
representative of online auction environments and there might be others in its 
class offering similar services.  This setting is different from the one described 
in Table 5.1,  in a way that eBay has buyer and seller protection programs 
which compensates to some extent the loss incurred, if any (eBayInc, 2007). 
Let δ be the factor with which losses are compensated. Including this 
compensation scheme the new payoffs for the game are given in Table 5.2. 
 
 
Table 5.2 Payoff Matrix for a Compensating Business Game 
Buyer 
 Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 
C Rseller= γ 
Rbuyer= γ 
Sseller =  - γ + δ 
Tbuyer = 2 γ 
D Tseller = 2 γ 
Sbuyer = - γ+ δ 
Pseller = 0 
Pbuyer = 0 
 
The compensation factor introduces a new relationship in the payoff 
inequalities described in equations (1) and (2) above. While the exact new 
condition is a factor of δ in reality, this addition of δ nevertheless changes the 
Strong Dilemma into a Weak Dilemma situation. The particular change is given 
in the equation below: 
      SP                                                                        (5.1) 
This small change introduces interesting consequence, as it increase the 
confidence of the player in acting cooperatively. In a real world scenario, if 
there is a third party protection for a transaction, the confidence of a buyer or 
seller increases, and this increase is in line with the fraction of compensation 
provided.  
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We simulate the evolution of cooperation in each of the Cases (Strong 
Dilemma, and weak dilemma) described above and present the results in next 
section.  
5.2.2 Incentive Based Business Game  
Another variation of the business game model that we introduce here is called 
the incentive based model. This model primarily concerns considering the 
player reputation and price related data of the goods in transaction while 
deciding on the pay-off value for an interaction. We use „bonus reward‟ as an 
incentive to cooperative behaviour in the game. Mutual cooperation in a game 
representing a single transaction would result in a payoff equivalent to the 
reward as in Table 5.1. Plus, we would assign a bonus reward, computed as a 
function of the player reputation and price value of the goods. In the other 
hand, in a case where both parties defect each other, their corresponding pay 
off values are subjected to a decrement in pay off indicating a more severe 
penalty for punishment. In the later case bonus reward would be subtracted 
from the reward value. In our approach towards this we base the reward and 
punishment pay off to be dependent on the following two parameters: 
i. The price value of the transaction (which is the reward value 
itself). 
ii. The existing cooperation probability (reputation) of the player. 
 Real world implementation of loss compensation scheme in the eBay has 
based the proportion of compensation on the reputation of the seller and the 
percentage of the price value of the goods (eBay, 2008). Our choice of the 
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parameters above is to model a case like that of eBay in this context.   The 
corresponding actions and associated pay offs for an incentive based setting is 
given in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Incentive Compatible Payoff Matrix for Business Game 
 
 
 Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 
C )(Psellerseller  R
 
)( PBuyerbuyer  R
 
sellers  
2BuyerT  
D 2sellerT  
Buyers  
))((P Psellerseller 
 
))((P PBuyerbuyer 
 
 
 
Here, γ represents the price value of goods being transacted and   represents 
the reputation of the player.  The reputation information is maintained by the 
system as a vector with a total number of Cooperation (C) and Defection (D):  
                







D
C
TH
                                                                                            (5.2)  
The expected probability of cooperation is given by the following expression:   
DC
C
PE n

)(                                                                                        (5.3) 
Where, the values for C and D are derived from the transaction history in (5.2).  
The explanation of the experimental setting in section 5.3 explains the problem 
and the models further.  
5.3 The experimental setting 
At the highest level of abstraction, our simulation model consists of a two 
dimensional spatial grid of players on a square surface with overlapping 
edges. Each player has eight neighbours with whom it plays the cooperation-
Pseller 
Pbuyer 
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defection game. This represents a selective game playing environment where 
each player doesn‟t play with every player, but instead the games happen in 
cluster- thus providing a natural representation to the business game problems 
involving different cluster of buyer and seller. Players are characterised by 
strategies for a 3-memory game. This means that each player while interacting 
with its neighbour will keep track of past three games. An action on what to do 
next will be guided by the particular strategy that matches the past three 
histories of interactions that each player maintains. Our choice of  3-memory 
has to do with strategy representation. We need the representation to be 
comprehensive such that it is capable of representing most of the standard 
strategies such as Tit-for-Tat, all time cooperator, all time defector, Tit-for-two 
tats, Pavlov etc and more of the random strategies. Our representation of 
game memory is best explained as a 3rd order Markov Process. Our system at 
this stage resembles markov model as it only possesses strategies for 
retaining past action records and besides that it is a memory less system. A 
Markov assumption is that the current state in a system depends only on a 
finite history of previous states and is called Markov process or Markov chains 
(Russell and Norvig, 1998). Weisstein (2009c) defines it as: 
A stochastic process  is called Markov if for every  and , we 
have  
 
               
For a Markov assumption Xt at time t, Xt depends on bounded subset of X0:t-1 . 
The transition model for a First-order Markov process is given by: 
P (Xt | X0:t-1) = P(Xt | Xt-1) 
Similarly, for a third order Markov process: 
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P (Xt | X0:t-1) = P(Xt | Xt-3, Xt-2, Xt-1) 
The corresponding Bayesian network structures for the first-order and third-
order markov process is given in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Bayesian network structure for a first-order (5.1a) and third order (5.1b) Markov 
Process 
Figure 5.2 shows a sample 5x5 square grid with 25 players in it. The 
highlighted player P7 plays games for a specified number of times with its 
eight neighbours who are P1, P2, P3, P8, P13, P12, P11, and P6. The games 
mentioned here represent the business interactions described in the 
Introduction section (5.1) and section (5.2) above.  
P0 P1 P2 P3 P4 
P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 
P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 
P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 
 
Figure 5.2. A 5X5 spatial grid with a player P7 highlighting its 8 neighbours 
CHAPTER 5. EVOLUTION OF CCOPERATION IN BUSINESS GAMES             84 
The actual evolution in the game is based on Genetic Algorithm. Genetic 
Algorithm (GA) as an intelligent search technique was introduced by computer 
scientist John Holland (Axelrod, 1987, Goldberg, 1989, Holland, 1975). Our 
use of GA evolution is based on, and inspired by, the original work of Axelrod 
in (Axelrod, 1987). In the GA environment, a player strategy is represented by 
a chromosome as a fixed length representation of the possible actions for a 
three memory game. With two possible actions (Cooperate or Defect) that can 
be played by each of the two interacting players, the all possible moves are 
CC, CD, DC, and DD. A three memory strategy for these four possible moves 
needed 4x4x4=64 bit chromosome length, beside Axelrod, Jenifer Goldbeck in 
(Goldbeck, 2002) has also used similar encodings to study the evolution of 
strategies in Prisoner‟s Dilemma. Axelrod (1987) used additional 6 bits as an 
assumption to determine the first three moves. A variation of this was used by 
Errity (2003) and we are following the same scheme of additional bit encoding, 
in which 7 extra bits are used for encoding actions for the first three relative 
moves (relative to opponent moves). It is thus not required to encode an 
assumption of the pre-game history. This makes the total chromosome length 
to be 71 bits with each locus outlining an action C or D to perform. The model 
when initialized consists of a specified number of players with random 
strategies. In each generation of evolution a pre-specified number of games 
are played between two players, at the end of which, the fitness of the 
chromosome of each player is evaluated by referring to the payoff values for 
the game. From player A‟s perspective, a CC action represents Reward 
Payoff, CD a Sucker‟s Payoff, DC a Temptation Payoff and DD a Punishment 
Payoff. Fittest strategies are selected for reproduction through crossover and 
mutation. One-point crossover (Poli and Langdon, 1997) is used to break the 
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parent chromosomes at the same random point as in Figure 5.3. Linear scaling 
of the fitness as described in (Goldberg, 1989) has been used to prevent 
premature convergence of the evolution.   
 
Figure 5.3 One point crossover performed on two Parent Strategies 
Cooperativeness of an individual strategy is assessed through its overall 
probability of cooperation, which in turn relies upon the number of references 
in the chromosome guiding a cooperative action. Strategies are classified into 
six different types as per the values of cooperation probability listed in Table 
5.4. Our classification at the moment is based on intuitive assumption (for the 
purpose of testing the model); however this can be easily mapped to any 
existing real world benchmarks when necessary. For instance, a seller with 
even 90% of positive feedback score in eBay might be considered 
untrustworthy for transactions. By suitably studying the characteristics of the 
application environment, thresholds for player types can be easily defined.   
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The classification we are considering here is sufficient and descriptive enough 
to study the evolution trend of cooperativeness in our experiments.   
 
Table 5.4 Classification of the strategy based on cooperation probability 
Strategy Type Cooperation 
Range in 
Chromosome 
Probability of 
Cooperation 
Very Cooperative > 65 >0.91 
Cooperative 55 to 65 0.77 to 0.90 
Good 50 to 54 0.7 to 0.76 
Okay 45 to 49 0.63 to 0.69 
Dishonest 35 to 44 0.49 to 0.62 
Very Dishonest < 35 < 0.49 
 
 
 
5.4 Experimental Results and Analysis 
The experiments have been carried out in two different phases. In the first 
phase a study of the evolution trend in the compensating business game 
environment is considered. Mainly the evolutions of defectors have been 
studied to particularly analyse the efficiency of such business models in 
filtering dishonest players. In the second phase of the experiment, we observe 
the evolution of the population of different strategies listed in Table 5.4 in a 
pro-incentive and a non-incentive setting. Comparative evolution trend of 
individual strategy in each of these environment have also been done.  
 
5.4.1 Compensating Game Experiments   
The experiments for this investigation were carried out for three different 
cases. In the first case (CASE I), the strong dilemma situation outlined in Table 
5.1 was considered and next we focused on the weak dilemma situation 
outlined in Table 5.2. In the later case we performed the experiments for two 
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sub cases. The first (CASE IIA) being a situation were the loss compensation 
percentage was 50, and in the second (CASE IIB) this percentage was set to 
100. This is in line with the proportional compensation that various online 
business sites provide as replacement money for cheated transactions.  Let 
be the price of the goods, and R the reward value. For the first case  2/R  
and in second case R .  
 
The simulation parameters in Table 5.5 have been used for all three 
experiments:    
 
Table 5.5 Simulation Parameters 
Parameter Value 
Total number of Players 2500 
Generations of Evolution 1000 
Transactions per Generation 200 
Crossover Probability 0.98 
Mutation Probability 0.01 
 
To decide on the parameters we first fixed the population to 2500 (to represent 
a good size of strategies). To decide on the transactions per generation, we 
had to be careful, as this number was proportional to the time taken by the 
simulation. However, a small value for transaction frequency might prevent the 
players from exploiting most of their memory three strategies. Axelrod (1987) 
had used an average run length of 151 for his strategy tournament.  We took 
an intuitive value of 200 as a trade-off between performance and fitness.  The 
probabilities for crossover and mutation were kept fixed for all the transaction. 
Though a variance in these values might give different patterns of evolution, 
this analysis is currently not included in our experiments. With these 
parameters fixed, we first ran several rounds of simulation to observe the point 
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in which the evolution would turn out to be stable. In this context, we limited the 
runs to 1000 generations as at this point, the evolution was relatively stable.   
 
Next set of parameters of the experiments were related to the payoff values 
which would be different for each of the cases outlined above. For this 
experiment we have assumed that all the goods being sold or purchased has 
the same value of £ 10, thus making reward for cooperation R=10. Based on 
this assumption, the other payoff values used for the three different cases are 
derived in Table 5.6. 
 
Table 5.6 Payoff Values for the Experimental Cases 
 
Payoff Category CASE I CASE IIA CASE IIB 
Reward (R) 10 10 10 
Temptation (T) 2R 2R 2R 
Sucker‟s (S) -R -R+ δ -R+ δ 
Punishment (P) 0 0 0 
Compensation (δ) N/A R/2 R 
 
 
The initial population roughly consisted of around 80% of cooperative players 
and 20% of deceptive ones. As we have been trying to observe the trend of the 
evolution of defectors, their size was intentionally kept small initially so that a 
full span of their evolution could be visible in the results. In the definition, we 
consider a player to be cooperative, if its strategy has a cooperation probability 
of 0.7 or above. Thus a defector has essentially less than 0.7 as probability of 
cooperation. In the strategy classification presented in Table 5.4, the strategies 
Very Dishonest, Dishonest and Okay would be considered as Defectors, and 
the remaining three would be taken as cooperative ones. We also consider in 
our experiments, a particular species of defector called Top Defector. This 
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strategy has the most vindictive nature with cooperation probability less than 
0.35. 
Results and Analysis 
From the cooperative evolution point of view, all the experiments gave 
depressive results. This can be easily derived from the graphs in Figure 5.4 (a 
graph for cooperative evolution would be complementary to these). To reach 
these results, the simulations for each of the cases listed in Table 5.6 were 
carried out for five runs and an average was taken to minimize the noise in 
evolution statistics. Figure 5.4a Shows the evolution of defectors in a strong 
dilemma situation. This situation, as described earlier, is a representative of an 
anonymous online business environment. In a condition where there is no 
mechanism which can enforce cooperation, it is natural that defection prevails, 
as this would give success to the player. The population of defectors which 
started from a mere 17% sharply increased until it reached a maximum of 74% 
in the 724th generation, after which it maintained a population in between 60-
70%. This trend reflects the high insecurity in transactions in these settings.   
  
What might be the result if the ones who lost in transaction were 
compensated? Would it contribute in reducing the defectors in the society? 
The two graphs in Figure 5.4b and Figure 5.4c have an answer to these 
questions. The results show that compensation certainly has negative impact 
on the growth of defectors and this impact is in some value proportional to the 
fraction of compensation.  Figure 5.4b is a 50% compensation case.  The 
result shows that the population of defectors in this setting has decreased as 
compared to the previous case, with a maximum population of only 55.16% in 
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275th generation. In case where a defected cooperator is returned full of the 
amount of goods or money, the cooperation evolution scenario was even 
better, with a record of only 45.70% of highest defectors in 233rd generation.  
 
 
 
 
(Fig 5.4a) 
 
 
 
(Fig 5.4b) 
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(Fig 5.4c) 
 
Figure 5.4. Evolution of Defective Strategies in (a) Strong Dilemma Conditions, (b) Weak 
Dilemma Condition with 50% Loss coverage, (c) Weak Dilemma Condition with 100% loss 
coverage 
The three figures discussed above represented the overall population of 
defectors. The impact of compensation was sharply visible in a particular 
species of defector which we call here Top Defector (with Cooperation 
Probability less than 0.35). This species has a strategy which allows it to 
cooperate only 25% of time. The evolution of this species is considered by 
the graph in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.5. Evolution of Top Defectors in various conditions  
The population of this species was highest in the strong dilemma case and a 
lower and yet lower portion was seen in the other two cases.  This suggests 
that the compensation scheme was successful in bringing down the population 
of this category of players. However, defective players are still prevalent in any 
of the cases examined above.  The outcome of these experiments suggests 
that an even stronger model to weaken the dilemma is required in order to 
promote cooperative evolution in online business settings.  
 
5.4.2 Incentive Game Experiments   
This set of experiment was carried out in two phases. In the first phase a total 
of 2500 players were selected to play a non-incentive business game for 5000 
generations with 200 iterations in each generation. Before deciding on these 
parameters of player numbers, generations and iterations, several rounds of 
simulations were conducted and observed. The evolution trend suggested that 
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for the given player size and iterations, the evolution continued without 
converging for a large number of generations. We set a cut off at 5000 
generations as this evolution size would be long enough to present our results. 
While adjusting player size, we first started with a small number, but tried to 
increase it as far as the computing resources for the large number would 
permit. The iteration cycle of 200 was chosen as a representation of average 
run length for a memory three game.  The pay-off values for this game were 
based on the explanation provided in Table 5.1. In the second phase by 
keeping the other parameters same, a pro-incentive business model with pay-
off values as listed in Table 5.3 was simulated. The system recorded the 
readings of the player evolution each interaction. The results obtained are an 
average of 10 rounds of simulation. We assume that each player initially has a 
truth telling probability of 1. Further, we assume that the players are 
transacting goods of same value through out.  
The stacked bar diagrams in Figure 5.6 shows the percentage growth share in 
the evolution of the six different types of players in each of the settings.  In the 
diagram, it is clearly shown that the population of cooperative players (Very 
cooperative, cooperative, and good players) rise to higher values as the 
evolution continues in a pro-incentive setting. Classification of these players in 
terms of probability of cooperation was presented in Table 5.4 before. The 
population of non cooperative players (very dishonest, dishonest and okay 
players) is high and continues to grow in a non-incentive setting.   
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Figure 5.6a 
 
 
Figure 5.6b 
Figure 5.6. Evolution of different player types over 5000 generations 
(1,100,500,1000,1500,2000,2500,3000,3500,4000,4500 and 5000 respectively) in a non-
incentive (5.6a) and pro-incentive (5.6b) business game environment 
Further, the evolution trends of each type of player were observed in 
comparison with respect to each game setting. The graphs in Figure 5.7 
represent the comparative trend of evolution of the six different types of 
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players.  The evolution trend in general shows that the pro-incentive setting is 
favourable for the evolution of cooperative players while the non-incentive 
setting is favourable to the non-cooperative player evolution.  
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Figure 5.7. Comparative evolution of six different player types in a non-incentive and pro-
incentive business game setting 
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5.5 Summary  
With the compensating games, it was not originally our intention to cast the 
“villains” (defectors) in our work. We initially started with the trend in evolution 
of cooperators. Ironically, the experiments gave depressive results for the 
evolution of cooperators. Insignificant impact of the compensation was seen in 
the evolution of cooperative players. This gave us a better insight into how 
fragile the situation was. We then turned our idea the other way round to see if 
these models had any impact on the defectors at all. The results showed that 
the models certainly had an impact on defectors and severely on the most 
selfish species which we named as Top Defectors. This is however not 
sufficiently reliable for online transactions; a conclusion that we have drawn 
from our experiments. For the evolution of safer societies for transaction, we 
might need more powerful models which could attack on the dilemma 
conditions and make it rational for the players to cooperate. Compensation to 
the looser is one approach. An approach that could complement the need here 
might be to provide incentives to the cooperators. In real world online business 
scenarios however, it might not be rational to directly give a benefit to 
someone just because they acted nicely. Indirect reflection of incentives on 
their reputation could be a promising idea of rewarding that could lead to 
cooperative evolution.  
 
We modelled the second experiment to consider this incentive concept. We 
suggested a pro-incentive model which demonstrated to be favourable for the 
evolution of cooperative players in society thus, leading to cooperation and 
better trustworthiness. Our investigation showed that the pro-incentive model 
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which is an interrelated representation of cooperative behaviour and reputation 
would be even more suitable for an open business environment.  
 
Our further investigation in this line would be to explore additional methods of 
quality assurance in online business environments. The results here show that 
incentives and compensation have positive roles, but they are certainly not 
enough. Exploration of reputation mechanism and in particular acquaintance 
based reputation mechanism is the subject of following chapter.  
 
 
 
   
 
6. Chapter 6 
Acquaintance Based Player 
Assessment Using Cooperative 
Evolution 
Reputation systems have been popular in several online market places 
involving anonymous players as it can provide crucial information on the 
trustworthiness of an object or individual player to combat selfish and 
deceptive behaviours from peers. Individual feedbacks on the quality of past 
association are the fundamental building blocks of reputation systems. Careful 
consideration in aggregating feedbacks from different sources is in fact very 
important in computing a reliable value for trustworthiness to facilitate decision 
making in a social dilemma situation like that of online market places.  
 
In this chapter we are considering a possible improvement to a reputation 
model like that of eBay, with our interest lying on investigating how the 
cooperativeness and population of cooperators would evolve if the weight of 
CHAPTER 6. ACQUAINTANCE BASED PLAYER ASSESMENT                          99 
the feedback source was assigned on the basis of past association between 
players. We categorize the feedback source as direct source, gray source and 
opposition friendly source to define an aggregation method for trustworthiness 
assessment that considers applying a dynamically computed weight to each 
source of feedback. Our result shows that breaking feedback sources on the 
basis of acquaintance and assigning weight accordingly favours the evolution 
of cooperativeness in the player society as compared to models which do not 
classify the feedback sources. A genetic algorithm based spatial iterated 
prisoner‟s dilemma (SIPD) environment has been used to simulate the 
experiments.      
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6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 introduced the notion of trust and reputation. Chapter 4 further 
explained a trust model (TruMet) for reputation based trustworthiness 
assessment.  The simple model presented in chapter 4 worked through an 
example to illustrate the working procedure of a reputation based 
trustworthiness system. It was seen that trust in someone or something 
emerges out of the quality of experience in dealings that the trustor has had 
with the trustee in the past. When such information from direct interaction is 
not available, the assessor might turn to the society and gather all relevant 
information on other‟s experiences in their past dealings with the candidate, 
before finally placing its trust in it(Aberer et al., 2006, Dellarocas, 2005, Josang 
et al., 2007, Yu and Singh, 2000). Such an estimation in which an object is 
held is known by the term “reputation” (Dictionary.com, 2007, Soanes and 
Hawker, 2005). 
 
Reputation mechanisms have been popularly used in online trading, peer to 
peer and multi-agent environments (Dellarocas, 2005, Xiong and Liu, 2004, Yu 
and Singh, 2000, Zhou and Hwang, 2007). Successful real world 
implementations like that of eBay, follows a binary reputation mechanism 
assigning (+1) for positive and (-1) for negative feedbacks. This mechanism of 
reputation aggregation largely remains indifferent to several key characteristics 
of Trust, such as Subjectivity, Context Sensitivity and Transitivity. The 
subjectivity and context sensitivity aspect of Trust were presented in Chapter 
4. A yet another interesting property of Trust is transitivity. The transitivity 
principle of trust is a form of reliability trust which can be obtained through 
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referrals in a network (Josang et al., 2007) (Liang and Shi, 2005). Let us 
assume there are three players, A, B and C. Further let A trust B and B trust C. 
Now say there is a situation where A has to interact with C and is wondering 
how much reliable is C. Given that A doesn‟t have a direct relationship with C 
here, the only way for A to acquire C‟s reliability is to ask B. B having a full 
trust on C refers C to A. As A trusts B, A also trusts C now. The transitivity 
aspect is depicted in Figure 6.1. 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Transitive Trust 
Transitivity aspect of trust is also discussed and supported in (Artz and Gil, 
2007), where the authors have shown trust decision to be a transitive process. 
The concept of trust transitivity and loosing trust while moving through the 
referral chain is discussed in (Wang and Sun, 2008). Authors claim that the 
level of trust with each additional chain in the referral network is discounted by 
some factor. 
 
Besides the transitivity property, the literature on Trust and Reputation do not 
speak much on other form of relationships that can exist between the referrers 
in a network. It is this gap that we intend to fill by designing a referral model 
which works on the basis of past association between players. The foundation 
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of this model lies on the transitivity property of trust but furthers it to establish 
meaningful relationships between the players in the society.  A comprehensive 
trust model that works on the basis of acquaintance based referrals is 
designed and tested for its efficiency in aiding a cooperative evolution.    
The remaining part of this section is structured as follows: Section 6.2 presents 
the design of the reputation based trust model; Section 6.3 explains the 
investigation method; 6.4 presents Results and Analysis and finally 6.5 
presents the summary of the chapter.   
 
6.2 The acquaintance based Reputation Model 
Reputation of a player in our model is based on the number of cooperative 
actions exhibited in the past, but we have further made a careful distribution of 
weights across the reputation of players classified according to their 
acquaintance with the subject player. Three different categories of players 
(which we call Reporters) are labelled accordingly: 
i. Most Direct Reporter (mR) is the player itself. MDR reports its own 
experience in the past games. 
ii. Gray Reporters (gR) represents the players with whom both of the 
players considering a transaction have played in the past. 
iii. Opposition Friendly Reporters (oR) are the players who have only 
played with the opposition and not the self in the past. 
We are assuming that such information in the real world scenario like that in a 
Peer-to-Peer business environment or a centralized environment like that of 
eBay would be available for public reference. Currently, eBay provides a 
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detailed list of all feedbacks to and by a particular seller or buyer, which can be 
seen as a source data for the classification like the one we mentioned above.     
As an example, the 4x4 grid in Figure 6.2 holds 16 players. Let‟s say PX and 
PY (P5 and P6 in the grid) are to decide on whether to play or not play the 
game. In this case PX and PY are themselves the mRs. P1, P2, P9 and P10 are 
the gRs to both PX and PY. P0, P4 and P8 are oRs to PY whereas P3, P7 and 
P11 are oRs to PX.  
P0 P1 P2 P3 
P4 P5 (PX) P6 (PY) 
 
P7 
P8 P9 P10 P11 
P12 P13 P14 P15 
 
Figure 6.2. Distribution of Players in a 4X4 spatial Grid 
In set theoretic notation: MR(PX) = {PX}, MR(PY)= {PY}, 
GR( PXY) = {P1, P2, P9, P10}, OR(PX)={P3, P7, P11}, and OR (PY)={P0, P4, P8}.    
 
The decision on whether to play a game or not is a function of the 
Trustworthiness Factor (TWF) which is generated by compiling reports from all 
three categories of players. Each report comprises of Reputation of the player 
which is computed as an estimation of cooperation based on the past history of 
interaction. A past interaction history of  player X with any player Y (HXY) is a 
vector containing a record of the total number of Cooperative(CY) and 
Deceptive (DY) interactions with X. Thus, HXY = [CY, DY], where CY ≥ 0 and DY ≥ 
0. Probability distribution of trustworthiness from such data can be inferred by 
the use of beta probability distribution function and has also been used by 
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different authors in (Baron, 2006, Josang and Ismail, 2002, Teacy et al., 2006). 
Beta probability distribution function (p| CY, DY) can be expressed using the 
gamma function Γ as: 
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With a condition that p ≠ 0 if CY < 1, and p≠1 if DY < 1, the probability 
expectation value of beta distribution is given by: 
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(6.2) 
If MR, GR, and OR represent the past interaction history for Most Direct, Gray 
and Opposition Friendly reporters respectively, then  the TWF of Player Y as 
assessed by Player X,  based on the probability expectation of Beta 
Distribution, is given by: 
                       
 
              
 
 
     
 
         
 
 
 
 
 (6.3) 
Where WMR, WGR, and WOR are the weights associated with each report and 
WMR + WGR + WOR = 1. The value for WMR, WGR, and WOR are obtained from 
the evolutionary data, as the game continues. The Most Direct Report (MR) 
being a direct representation of first hand information (zero hop reporters) is 
considered to be more influential in decision making and thus is assigned to as 
WMR. Out of the remaining sum available for weight, three quarters is assigned 
to WGR as a single hop reporter to X, while one fourth is assigned to WOR as a 
double hop reporter. This approach gives a least priority to the report from the 
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players with whom no game has ever been played, but at the same time does 
not ignore them totally.  
Players have an associated variable threshold (TH) which determines the 
minimum level of trustworthiness expected from the opponent in order to play 
a game. A function CAN_PLAY (PX, PY) representing a decision module for a 
game of PX with PY returns TRUE if and only if, TWF (PXY)≥ THX, where THX 
represents the threshold value of player X.   
6.3 The method of investigation 
The experiments for this investigation were carried out through the business 
game models established and described in section 5.3. It follows the same 
economic model based on Iterated Prisoner‟s Dilemma, and the genetic 
algorithm based experimental environment is also kept the same (as in 
Chapter 5). The variation in this model is the introduction of the acquaintance 
based reputation model which aids a player in reaching to a decision on 
whether to play or not. In earlier setting in Chapter 5, such restrictive 
impositions were not placed. We choose the strong dilemma represented by 
the model in Table 5.1 as we are not considering any additional methods of 
loss compensation or incentives in this case. 
The following parameters in Table 6.1(and values related to evolution) were 
used in the experiments:    
Table 6.1 Simulation Parameters 
Parameter Value 
Total number of Players 100 
Generations of Evolution 100 
Transactions per  Generation 151 
Crossover Probability 0.98 
Mutation Probability 0.01 
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The player population of 100 was chosen to represent a good enough size of 
strategies. With this number of players, sufficient interactions were observed, 
as each player in the grid plays with eight neighbours and each of these 
neighbours in turn play with their eight neighbours.  Simulations were limited to 
100 generations as at this point, the evolution was relatively stable in terms of 
the average pay-off derived from each interaction. We had to be careful with 
the number of transactions as this number was proportional to the time taken 
by the simulation. However, a small value for transaction frequency might 
prevent the players from exploiting most of their memory three strategies. 
Axelrod in (Axelrod, 1987) had used an average run length of 151 for his 
strategy tournament.  We took the same value of 151 as a tradeoff between 
performance and fitness. Like in the experiments in chapter 5, in this case also 
we keep fixed the crossover and mutation probabilities for similar reasoning. 
The pay-off values are taken from Table 5.6.   
 
In the simulation model, the decision making system is designed to come into 
effect only when the players have played a required minimum number of 
games (crossed the warm-up phase). Reputation won‟t be built until there have 
been enough games, and a decision making system coming into effect without 
enough reputation built by players might prevent them from playing enough 
games.  An important aspect of the simulation is the initial composition of the 
players. In our experiments we have chosen a balanced population of 
strategies where a larger number of players would act in a balanced way and a 
smaller number of them would act as either of the extreme ones. Our 
composition of the players is not based on any particular application scenario, 
CHAPTER 6. ACQUAINTANCE BASED PLAYER ASSESMENT                          107 
but it is rational to assume that many players in society would play balanced 
games and cheaters as well as blind co-operators would remain a minority.  
 
6.4 Results and Analysis 
Two things primarily noted to study the Evolution of Cooperativeness were; 
firstly, the evolution of „cooperativeness Index‟ and secondly, the Population of 
highly cooperative Strategies.  The Cooperativeness Index is a ratio of the 
expected probability of cooperation of the strongest strategy to that of the 
weakest strategy in each generation. Any strategy that could obtain a highest 
pay-off was termed Strongest while the one leading to lowest pay-off was 
termed weakest.  
For an ith strongest strategy Si and jth weakest strategy Wj, the cooperativeness 
index (CoOPIndex) is given by: 
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P
E 
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 =CoOPIndex                                                                                 (6.4)  
 
Where, Ep represents the expected probability of cooperation and is calculated 
according to equation 6.2. 
 
In the business game that we modelled, a strongest strategy with high 
expected probability of cooperation indicates that such a strategy has more 
instances guiding cooperation- and that cooperation in the game is earning 
more than defection. Thus, this entails that a higher Cooperativeness Index 
(CoOPIndex) means a more cooperative society.   This index was calculated 
for each of the hundred generations of Evolution for each experimental setting 
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considered. The population study of the highly cooperative strategies 
concerned the study of the evolution of strategies with expected probability of 
cooperation greater than 90 percent.  This was studied by analyzing the 
number of cooperative actions against the defective actions of each 
chromosome representing strategies for a memory-3 game.  
 
Three different settings were considered for the experiments.  
 
 In the first setting the simulations were carried out in an environment 
without any sort of Trustworthiness Assessment.  
 
 In the second setting a business game environment with reputation 
system NOT considering the weights of the feedback sources was 
simulated.  
 
 The third instance considered having a reputation system with 
feedbacks being weighed and aggregated on the basis of past 
acquaintances between the players.  
In each setting that involved having a reputation system, two different 
thresholds 0.1 and 0.9 were considered. A threshold here represents a 
minimum value of Trustworthiness Factor, TWF (as obtained from equation 6.3 
in Section 6.3) for a player to decide on whether to play or not with its 
opponent. These two thresholds were chosen to represent a relatively low 
(0.1) and high (0.9) level of cooperation expected from the opponent. The 
results expressing the evolution of cooperativeness index in a system without 
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any Trustworthiness Assessment is shown in Figure 6.3. Initially non steady 
results, with an average CoOPIndex of 0.92, attaining a steady 1 after the 60th 
generation was observed. Once the steady state is reached the game payoffs 
become constant thus indicating no significant changes in the evolution of 
strategies.  
 
Figure 6.3. Evolution of Cooperativeness Index without Trustworthiness Assessment   
Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5 show the comparative evolution of CoOP Index in a 
non-weighted and weighted assessment at threshold 0.1 and 0.9 respectively. 
When these trends are compared to that of evolution in Figure 6.3, both of 
them seem to have better results. An average of 0.95 for non-weighted setting 
and 1 for weighted setting was observed at TH 0.1. The evolution showed a 
comparatively better outlook when the threshold was raised to 0.9. First thing 
to notice was that the entire evolution was smooth, with values increasing and 
maintaining steadiness- indicating a better and predictive probability of 
cooperativeness from players. As depicted in Figure 6.5 an average CoOP 
Index of 1.16 was noted for weighted setting. 
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Figure 6.4. Evolution of Cooperativeness Index at TH 0.1 
 
Figure 6.5. Evolution of Cooperativeness Index at TH 0.9  
The results from Figure 6.3, Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5 suggest that presence 
of assessment system improves trustworthiness among the players. Further, it 
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showed that our model of Trustworthiness Assessment performs even better in 
terms of increasing the overall cooperativeness of the society.   
 
Figure 6.6 shows evolution of the population of very cooperative players 
(players with strategies having the expected probability of cooperation greater 
than 0.91 – as per the classification in Table 5.4, Section 5.4) in settings with 
and without assessment system. The thresholds considered above have also 
been explored for the evolutionary study. The result shows that the highest 
percentage of very-cooperative players evolved in the setting considering a 
weighted acquaintance based trustworthiness assessment.     
 
 
Figure 6.6. Evolution of Very Cooperative Players in different settings  
An average of 28.88% of the population in this setting was seen to be very 
cooperative. While this population in a system without assessment was in an 
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average of 1.32% only. Similarly, the population at threshold 0.9 without a 
weighted assessment was at 12.11% which is significantly low as compared 
to the weighted setting.  
 
The results above primarily focused on analyzing the cooperativeness in 
strategy of the players. Another way to look into this aspect is to analyse the 
actual moves by the players, or in other words the past history of the players. 
The trustworthiness assessment model presented in section 6.2 makes use of 
such historical data to compute a reference value. Cooperativeness of a 
strategy reflects how reliable (or cooperative) a player might be for future 
interactions, whereas cooperativeness through past history gives the actual 
statistics of cooperation and defection.  
 
The comparative bar diagrams in Figure 6.7 represent average number of 
matches filtered along the strictness of the trustworthiness factor. For the 
simulation parameters same as that in Table 6.1, a total number matches to be 
played between two players is; two players, playing with each of its eight 
neighbours for 151 times through 100 generations of evolution, i.e. 2 x 8 x 151 
x 100= 241600 matches. This means that this much number of matches would 
be played between the two players, given that there is no any conditional 
assessment. The result shows that, when the assessment threshold was as 
low as 0.1, an average of 241587.9 matches were played in a non-weighted 
setting, where as a weighted setting allowed all matches. Along the increasing 
strictness, number of matches kept decreasing in both the settings. However, 
a weighted assessment consistently filtered less matches than a non-weighted 
assessment. At the strictness of 1, the total matches played in a non-weighted 
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setting drooped to an average of 40.77 whereas this remained at an average 
of 1147.6 in the weighted setting.     
 
  
 
Figure 6.7. Number of matches in a weighted and non weighted setting along the threshold 
value  
    This result when co-related with that in Figure 6.8 shows that in a weighted 
setting, the matches were filtered, but the average cooperativeness of players 
remained higher along the strictness of threshold as compared to that in the a 
non weighted setting, and that this was more evident towards the higher 
threshold. At the threshold of 0.9, the average cooperativeness in a weighted 
setting was seen to be 0.97, where as the non-weighted setting scored an 
average of 0.56.  
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Figure 6.8. Comparative Average Cooperativeness of players in a weighted and non weighted 
setting along the threshold value 
This trend of increase in cooperativeness is also inline with the results on 
cooperativeness index seen in Figure 6.4, Figure 6.5 and the evolution of 
cooperative players in Figure 6.6.  
The overall result shows merit in classifying the feedback sources according to 
the past acquaintances between players.  
6.5 Summary 
We designed an anonymous online business model on the foundations of 
Iterated Prisoner‟s Dilemma to study the evolution of cooperativeness. An 
acquaintance based reputation system classifying and weighing feedbacks 
and its sources on the basis of the nature of past association was plugged-in to 
the business game model to study the contribution of such system in raising 
the overall cooperativeness of the society. The simulations to study the 
evolution of cooperativeness Index (CoOP Index) were carried out in three 
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different settings-firstly in a model without reputation system at all, secondly in 
a setting where feedback sources were not weighed by the reputation system 
and finally in a setting relying on acquaintance based classification. Our results 
have shown that having a reputation system certainly aids in the promotion of 
cooperative society- but it is our acquaintance based model of Trustworthiness 
Assessment   which was seen to be promoting cooperativeness among the 
players. It was further seen that the acquaintance based weighing model 
acquired a higher level of Cooperativeness Index when the threshold for the 
Trustworthiness Factor was set to high as compared to a lower threshold 
value. The population of very cooperative players was also seen to be 
considerably high in an acquaintance based environment. In addition, actual 
moves of the players were also analysed to study the trend of average 
matches and average cooperativeness along the threshold line. Our approach 
of assessing trustworthiness also contributes in filtering possibly dishonest 
feedbacks by providing higher weight to the feedback source trusted by 
oneself in past dealings- thus enabling our system with an inbuilt exogenous 
filter.           
All these results suggest that there is merit in classifying the source of 
feedback according to the nature of past association. This is in contrast to the 
approaches of online selling sites like eBay where there is no provision of 
weighing feedbacks by any means- leaving this job clearly to manual 
judgment. Findings of our experiment recommend having an acquaintance 
based weighted trustworthiness assessment in online business environments 
and multi-agent systems involving the problem of trustworthiness assessment 
in general.  
   
 
7. Chapter 7 
Decision Theoretic 
Trustworthiness Assessment  
Previous chapters have considered a probabilistic reputation and 
trustworthiness assessment model to study the evolution of cooperativeness in 
different settings. It was seen that a probabilistic model aids in resolving 
uncertainty by assessing the trustworthiness level of players. In this chapter 
we intend to further enhance the existing model by combining the probabilistic 
assessment part with the expected utility of each player resulting in a decision 
theoretic assessment. In this form of assessment, a player makes a decision 
on the basis of what it believes (given by the probabilistic assessment) and 
what it wants (given by the utility value of the choice). This method ensures 
that the players make a continuous measure of the state quality. The 
assessment of trustworthiness in this model is guided by the principle of 
maximum expected utility, which enforces a rational player to choose an action 
only if that meets its expected utility. The significance of this model- we believe 
lies in „realistically‟ assessing the opponent‟s worthiness in the online trading 
environments.  
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7.1 Introduction 
Most of the times, in daily life activities, making decision on whether to choose 
between particular sets of actions usually depend on more than one criteria. 
People tend to compare between the multiple aspects of each choice and 
finally reach to a decision by choosing a particular action that seems to meet 
their satisfaction level. As an example, let us consider a firm which is thinking 
of introducing a new product in the market. Out of many, two parameters that it 
could asses to reach a decision on whether to introduce the product or not 
could be: a). the market demand for the product, and b). the current supply of 
similar products by other suppliers. A decision to introduce or not should jointly 
be based on the analysis of both of these parameters (by also considering 
other parameters that apply). It would be hard as well as unrealistic to just 
reach a decision on the basis of a single parameter only. Similarly, we 
consider an yet another example relevant to the online business communities; 
a buyer‟s decision on which competing seller to choose for a purchase can be 
based on the price that he is offering and the seller‟s reputation. Sometimes, 
there can be situations where there lies a trade-off between these sets of 
parameters. In a more complex form, there can be many parameters (more 
than two) which need to be considered while making a decision. For example, 
besides reputation and price, the online buyer‟s choice of seller can also be 
influenced by factors like the delivery time, payment methods, specification of 
the goods, after sales service etc.   
 
A branch of mathematics and statistics that deals with making such decisions 
is called Decision Theory (Berger, 1985). Decision theory together with Utility 
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theory has been used popularly in both decision making under risk and in 
decision making under uncertainty (Parsons and Wooldridge, 2002, Russell 
and Norvig, 1998). Risky and uncertain situation represent a partially 
observable task environment where there exists little or no knowledge about 
the occurrence or non-occurrence of the undesired event or action. The 
possible action could be inferred through some existing data and probabilistic 
assessment based on them. The terms Risk and uncertainty at times are used 
synonymously, but the difference lies in the fact that risky situations have 
some known probability of things going adverse, but with uncertain situation, 
knowledge of such probabilities are unknown (Riegelsberger et al., 2005). The 
level of risk involved in a situation increases with the degree of uncertainty 
existing there. It is thus necessary to tackle uncertainty to reduce the risk and 
manage the risk to avoid making an undesirable decision.  Game Theory 
(Ross, 2009) is a related concept to decision theory which models a decision 
problem as a competing interaction between the players.  A game theoretic 
representation of a certain decision problem contains a set of players with 
some defined set of actions and strategies to guide a particular action. Any 
rational player would choose an action that would maximise the utility value of 
the game.    
 
Our investigation in this chapter furthers our work until now by adopting a 
decision theoretic approach to the assessment of a player‟s trustworthiness. 
We have considered calculating a Maximum Expected Utility (MEU) of any 
proposed interaction between the players on the basis of the expected utility 
value of the transaction and the probability of cooperation of the players 
associated. This kind of assessment as compared to the one in which we 
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make decisions based merely on the past history of cooperation or reputation 
figure is more realistic and is also scalable for possible future models which 
might include consideration of other parameters for evaluation, for example the 
buyer and seller protection programs.  
 
The remaining part of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.2 
describes the background on decision theory and utility theoretic concepts. We 
present our decision theoretic model in section 7.3. Investigation methods 
have been outlined in 7.4 and the results of the experiments detailed in 7.5. 
Section 7.6 gives a summary of the findings.  
 
7.2 Background  
Decision theoretic framework as a solution to problems involving decision 
making has been used in many application fronts in computer science, just a 
few examples of these include multi agent systems MAS (Parsons and 
Wooldridge, 2002), page ordering and ranking systems (Cohen et al., 1998, 
Zoeter et al., 2008), multimedia content identification (Avinash et al., 2008), AI 
planning (Blythe, 1999), Information retrieval (Ye Diana and Guisseppi, 2006). 
Potential of the decision theoretic framework in modeling problems related to 
representation, inference, and knowledge engineering was described  by 
(Horvitz et al., 1988) in the context of expert systems, and today most of the 
popular applications are in those domains.   
 
The decision theory basically relies upon probability theory and utility theory, 
where preferences expressed by utilities are combined with probabilities to 
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reach a decision. This simplifies decision making to a simple act of choosing 
the alternative on the basis of the utility score assigned to different outcomes.  
At heart, the fundamental idea of decision theory is that a decision is rational if 
and only if it has chosen an action that yields the highest expected utility 
averaged over all the possible outcomes of the action (Russell and Norvig, 
1998). This is referred to as the principle of Maximum Expected Utility (MEU).  
The concept of utility theory can be used in cooperative as well as non-
cooperative games (Kaneko and Wooders, 2004). 
 
Utility theory and in particular the expected utility theory has been a 
predominant analysis method for decision making under risk (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). Accepted normally as a normative model of rational choice the 
theory is widely applied as a descriptive model of economic behaviour 
(Friedman and Savage, 1948, Schoemaker, 1982).  
 
We quote the following examples on insurance and gambling from (Friedman 
and Savage, 1948) Page 279 to make clear the applications of this theory: 
“An individual who buys fire insurance on a house he owns is 
accepting the certain loss of a small sum (insurance premium) in 
preference to the combination of a small chance of a much larger loss 
(the value of the house) and a large chance of no loss. That is, he is 
choosing certainty in preference to uncertainty. An individual who buys 
a lottery ticket is subjecting himself to a large chance of losing a small 
amount (the price of the lottery ticket) plus a small chance of winning a 
large amount (a prize) in preference to avoiding both risks. He is 
choosing uncertainty in preference to certainty. ”  
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The example above presents two different cases, the first one of insurance, 
where an individual is choosing certainty over uncertainty and in the next one 
on gambling the player chooses uncertainty over certainty. Utility theory thus 
has an application in both situations one in which the individual likes avoiding 
risk, the other where he likes bearing risk.    
 
In utility theory, the choice of an action is based upon a real valued score 
which is produced by utility functions that represent the desirability of the 
particular state. Expected utility theory could also be thought of as a 
“probability- weighted utility theory” where each alternative is assigned a 
weighted average of its utility values under different states of nature using 
probabilities of these states as weights (Hansson, 1994). 
 
According to (Russell and Norvig, 1998),  if U be the expected utility and P 
represent the probability of the occurrence of any state S, then the maximum 
expected utility for all the n possible states of S is calculated as : 
                                                                                                   (7.1) 
 
Let us take a simple example here to illustrate the concept. Suppose that an 
individual investor with a current wealth of £10 is considering an investment. A 
fair coin (which has equal probability of showing head (0.5) or tail (0.5)) is 
flipped in this investment. If head comes up then the investor wins £5, and his 
total wealth increases to £15. In case of a tail, the investor looses £5 and his 
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wealth decrease to £5. Thus, the two states possible in this case are first the 
head state which represents a gain and the tail one which represents loss.  
 
The maximum expected utility (MEU) of this investment according to equation 
7.1 is be obtained as: 
 
                          
 
This is a fair game(Weisstein, 2009b) scenario. In real world problems, where 
there exists some knowledge of the probability of occurrence of some event, 
the situation can be different. We take another example to explain this sort of 
situation.   
For example, an individual is exploring the market to buy some goods (say a 
laptop). He finds that there are two possible ways to obtain one- either he can 
buy it online over eBay, or he can go into a local store and pick one directly 
from there. Suppose that the cost of the laptop over eBay is £500 and seller 
has a feedback profile with a score of 90% meaning that the probability of 
receiving the product as expected is 0.90. In the second option the price is 
kept at the same £500 and the probability of getting the exact product as 
expected is, say 80%, i.e. is the probability of getting it is 0.80 (We are 
assuming here that the product is an easy find on the online market but is a 
rare one in the stores).   The Maximum Expected Utility (MEU) for each of the 
case outlined above can be calculated as below: 
Case I: The eBay purchase case, say MEU eBay 
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For Case II, the store shopping case, MEUstore 
                                 
             
       
 
From the examples above it can be seen that the expected gain in case of the 
first case is higher than that in the second case. Any rational individual 
considering a purchase should opt to purchase the goods online via eBay (in 
our example) as this is maximising the expected gain of the buyer in this case.   
 
Further, let‟s assume that there is a buyer protection program on eBay and that 
it covers 50% of the total loss in case of default. If we consider the contribution 
of this assurance, the MEU can be calculated as: 
                                               
            
        
 
The MEU obtained in this latter case shows that the consideration of protection 
program adds more confidence to the buyer.  
Here the utilities have been measured in terms of monetary value, assuming 
that usefulness in these cases are best described by money. In such cases 
maximum expected utility is also referred to as Expected Monetary Value 
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(EMV) (Jordaan, 2005). In our models, we also use money as an attribute of 
measuring utility. Researches have shown that utility of money is proportional 
to the natural logarithm of the amount of money (Jordaan, 2005, Kritzman, 
1998, Russell and Norvig, 1998). This means that utility of money has 
logarithmic relationship and that it is an example of non-linearity.  Figure 7.1 
presents a plot of monetary value (1 to 50) against its natural logarithm to 
produce the utility curve.   
 
 
Figure 7.1. Utility curve of Monetary Value (1-50) 
The curve of monetary utility fulfils both the properties of utility function namely 
the non-satiation property and the risk aversion property – thus making it a 
legitimate utility function. The utility function of money is a twice differentiable 
function (Bianconi, 2003). For any monetary value V>0, the first derivate of the 
utility function U is always greater than zero (i.e. U‟(v)>0 ).  The second 
derivative of the function is always less than zero (U‟‟(v)<0). The non-satiation 
property observed by the first derivative suggests that the utility increases with 
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increasing monetary value. The risk aversion property observed by the second 
derivative suggests that the marginal utility decreases with the increasing 
wealth. This means that for any rational player, there lies always a desire to 
obtain a little more wealth, but with accumulating wealth, the usefulness of the 
unit value of wealth decreases (Bianconi, 2003, Russell and Norvig, 1998).      
In the next section, we discuss on our assessment model which relies on the 
concept of decision and utility theory outlined above.  
 
7.3 The Decision Theoretic Model 
There are particularly two different instances where we use decision theoretic 
principles in our business game model. Firstly, we design the payoff of each 
interaction to be based on the utility value measured in terms of units called 
utils. The second application of decision and utility theory is in designing the 
trustworthiness threshold calculator. Unlike reputation scores of players 
determining whether or not the game should be played, we base our decision 
to do so on the maximum expected utility (MEU) value - the concept of which 
was explained in section 7.2. The concept and design of the utility payoff 
model is explained in the following subsection.     
 
7.3.1 The utility Payoff Model 
The utility pay-off is concerned with the outcome state of each interaction, and 
depends on the action taken by the particular players in the game. Our 
decision theoretic model of the business game is based on the same game 
theoretic concepts used in modelling interactions between players described in 
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Chapter 5. The model representing the business game between the players is 
based on the principles of Iterated Prisoner‟s Dilemma (IPD). The IPD (and 
also our business game model) represents a two-player, non-zero sum, non-
cooperative, simultaneous game with players following pure strategy for 
interaction (Ba et al., 2003, Chaudhuri et al., 2002, Howley and Riordan, 2007, 
Li, 2004).   
 
Our game theoretic model consists of two players, player One (P1) and Player 
Two (P2). Each of these player have two possible actions, either it is a 
Cooperation or Defection.  
 
An altogether four different situations can arise: first, both players cooperate, 
second, when the first cooperates and the second defects, third, when the 
second cooperates and the first defects, and finally when both defect. Each of 
these actions has an associated pay-off. Pay-offs can be assigned arbitrarily, 
or they can be based on the gain and losses according to the nature of the 
game.   For example the pay-off matrix presented in Table 5.1 in chapter 5 lists 
the possible outcomes for a typical business game. Here, we improvise this 
pay-off for a business interaction between two decision theoretic players. We 
use the term player to mean a seller or buyer participating in the business 
game, and further assume that the goods and equivalent wealth have the 
same level of significance to both of the players (seller and buyer). In game 
theoretic modeling, representation of gain and loss in business and investment 
scenario through pay off based on goods price and investment amount have 
been practiced in (Ba et al., 2003, Chaudhuri et al., 2002). We base our pay-
offs on the cost price of the goods, but carry it further on to calculate gain and 
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loss in terms of the maximum expected utility(MEU) of the player. As described 
in section 7.2, the maximum expected utility of a player is a function of the 
expected utility of the trade (the cost price of the goods in this case), and the 
expected probability of cooperation of the opponent player at that particular 
instance. The consideration of MEU as a payoff as opposed to the exact 
monetary value of the goods is more realistic and is the heart of the decision 
theoretic model that we incorporate in the game. The probability based payoff 
in our case introduces dynamic value to the gain and loss, thus truly 
preserving the subjective nature of the utility of transactions. Later, we show 
through our results that this approach has merit as it contributes in increasing 
the overall cooperativeness of the population, and also in optimising the 
average utility of business games.  
 
To explain the model, let:  
the value   represent the price of the goods in transaction 
     represent the probability of cooperation of player one (P1) at the time of 
the game 
     represent the probability of cooperation of player two (P2) at the time of the 
game 
    represent the maximum expected utility of the transaction for player1  
    represent the maximum expected utility of the transaction for player2  
      represent the reward pay-off to Player1 for mutual cooperation at time t 
      represent the reward pay-off to Player2 for mutual cooperation at time t 
      represent the temptation payoff that Player1 obtains while defaulting the 
cooperating Player2 at time t 
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      represent the temptation payoff that Player2 obtains while defaulting the 
cooperating Player1 at time t 
      represent the sucker‟s payoff that player1 obtains for cooperating a 
defaulting Player2 at time t 
      represent the sucker‟s payoff that player2 obtains for cooperating a 
defaulting Player1 at time t 
    represent the punishment pay-off for mutual defection for player1  
    represent the punishment pay-off for mutual defection for player2  
 
On the basis of this, the maximum expected utility of a transaction (M) for any 
player P (with two possible outcome states of cooperation, or defection) 
according to equation 7.1 can be obtained as: 
 
                                                                                             (7.2) 
Further, the reward, sucker, temptation and punishment payoff for these 
players on basis of the maximum expected utility relation in equation 7.2 can 
be obtained as follows: 
                                                                                    (7.3) 
                                                                                    (7.4) 
                             )                                                 (7.5)         
                             )                                               (7.6)         
                            )                                                   (7.7) 
                            )                                                   (7.8)     
                                                                                                     (7.9)                                                                 
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The models have given a significant importance to the time variable. This is 
mainly to represent the dynamic nature of each of these models. A utility 
based on cost alone remains static throughout the game, but when the payoff 
becomes a function of the cost and cooperation probability, due to the fact that 
reputation of players is dynamic, the whole computation leads to different 
values for each interaction.  The pseudo code in Figure 7.2 presents an 
algorithm based on which individual players are awarded payoffs for a 
transaction. 
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Figure 7.2. Pseudo Code for the Decision Theoretic Payoff Model  
The pay off for the punishment case is kept at a zero value to represent the 
status quo, this was reasoned in section 2.4.  The payoffs honour the 
inequalities (presented in 2.4 equations 2.1 and 2.2) necessary for a dilemma 
to exist. We use this payoff model in our experiments of decision theoretic 
assessment and present the results in section 7.5.  
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7.3.2 The utility Threshold Model 
Another important aspect of a decision theoretic design is the threshold model. 
By threshold, we mean the minimum expected utility that is believed to be 
obtained through certain transaction. In a reputation model, this threshold is 
equivalent to the minimum expected trustworthiness of the player in order to 
play the game. A decision theoretic threshold assessment couples the 
probabilistic assessment with the utility value of each transaction to set a 
desired expectation level in order to play a game. Essentially, a threshold in 
this case is a filter that allows or disallows an engagement based on whether 
the opponent meets or doesn‟t meet the minimum expected utility.   
Let Τ represent the threshold level for a transaction, and U (λ) represent the 
utility of any product worth λ. Given   is the probability that a transaction goes 
successful, a maximum expected utility based threshold Τ is given by: 
 
Τ =    * U (λ) +       * (-U (λ))                                           (7.10) 
 
Just before the transaction, each of the players calculates the maximum gain 
that could be obtained through the transaction by using the formula given in 
equation 7.2.  Each then compares this gain    with the threshold barrier Τ 
obtained through equation 7.10. A transaction happens only when the gain is 
greater than or equal to the Τ value. The pseudo code in Figure 7.3 presents 
this algorithm. 
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Figure 7.3. Pseudo Code for Threshold Computation and Game Decision  
The method of investigation outlined in section 7.4 makes use of these two 
models designed in this section. The different parameters and values for them 
are also discussed and explained in the following section.   
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7.4 The method of investigation 
In section 5.2 we explained a prisoner‟s dilemma based business game model. 
Further, a reputation model was designed in section 6.2 and plugged into this 
system to study the effectiveness of the reputation model. Our experimental 
framework for the investigation into the effectiveness of the decision theoretic 
model is based on the combined models of section 5.2 and 6.2.  
 
The utility payoff model established here is an addition to the existing system. 
We have replaced the earlier payoff algorithm by the newly developed models 
in this section. As the new payoff models take care of the inequalities that 
needs to be fulfilled for a dilemma, this platform is a valid one for our 
investigation. The reputation threshold model is replaced by the decision 
theoretic threshold model the design of which was explained in the earlier 
section.  
 
In our experiments, we assume all the goods transacted to be of the same 
value, worth £10. We make this factor a constant so as to produce 
comparative results. The utility of different items (with different price value) is 
certainly different and that would not serve our purpose of study in this context. 
To understand how maximum expected utility (MEU) grows against the 
increasing probability of cooperation from 0 to 1, we compute MEU for a utility 
value of 10. The computation is made using equation 7.1. The examples 
presented in section 7.2 had shown how to compute MEU for any given utility 
value. The chart presented in Figure 7.4 shows this distribution.  
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Figure 7.4. Growth of MEU against increasing cooperation probability for a utility value of 10. 
From the chart above, we can see that for a single valued product, its utility 
increases with the increasing probability of cooperation.     
 
The other Simulation Parameters are as explained in Table 6.1 in Chapter 6. 
We have considered three different threshold levels for the investigation; first, 
a threshold of zero representing a fair game expectation. Secondly, a mildly 
strict threshold with an expected utility of 5 or higher, and thirdly a strict 
threshold demanding the players to cross the barrier of 9 (values calculated 
with the cost being set at £10).  In the experiment, the probability of 
cooperation that is used in calculating the maximum expected utility is dynamic 
and changes with the behaviour of particular player in the game. At the 
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beginning, players develop reputation by first warming-up, and during this time 
the threshold computation model doesn‟t come into effect.  
 
7.5 Results  
To test the effectiveness of the decision theoretic model in promoting the 
cooperative evolution in the player society, we have selected a set of 
parameters to study their trend of evaluation. The sub-section below describes 
them. 
 
7.5.1 The Evaluation Parameters 
  
i. Evolution of Cooperative Strategies: Table 5.4 in section 5.3 presented 
the classification of the players according to the cooperation probability of their 
strategies. Out of the six different types, the first three (very cooperative, 
cooperative and good) of them have been classified as cooperative ones. 
Thus, a cooperative player in this context would have a cooperation probability 
of 0.7 or higher.  We study the evolution these players and see whether the 
new setting has been favourable for their growth. 
 
ii. Evolution of Cooperativeness Index: The concept of cooperativeness 
index   as a ratio of the cooperation probability of the strongest strategy to that 
of the weakest strategy in each generation of evolution was introduced and 
explained in section 6.4. The evolution of the same parameter has been 
considered here. 
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iii. Evolution of average utility payoff: Each interaction in the game has an 
associated payoff. In each generation of evolution, the games are played for a 
specified number of times before the fitness of an individual strategy is 
evaluated. Any strategy earning the highest payoff is considered the fittest for 
reproduction. In this context, an average utility payoff represents the average 
of the payoffs of the strongest and weakest strategy in each generation. 
Evolution of this figure relates itself to the evolution of cooperation as we see 
this in the results discussed below.      
7.5.2 Results and Analysis 
 
Firstly we consider the evolution of cooperative strategies. As mentioned 
before, strategies with the probability of cooperation with 0.7 or higher were 
considered at the beginning. With the interesting trend in the evolution, we 
further restricted it to see the evolution trend of those with a probability of 0.77 
or higher.  
Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6 have presented this evolution.  
 
CHAPTER 7. DECISION THEORETIC TRUSTWORTHINESS ASSESMENT       137 
 
 
Figure 7.5. Evolution of cooperative players in a decision theoretic setting at different 
Threshold levels 
From Figure 7.5 it can be seen that at the maximum expected utility threshold 
of 9, the evolution of cooperative players soon reached the full size of 100% 
before 50th generation itself. This shows the effectiveness and usefulness of 
the filter in promoting cooperative act in the society. A fair game expectation 
considering to play at expected utilities greater than zero proved to be not 
good for the evolution of cooperative players. At the end of 100th generation, 
the cooperative population is seen to be almost negligible.    At threshold of 
TH=5, the evolution is better than at zero, but it still remained below 80%.  
As the cooperative population reached a 100%, we slightly increased the level 
of cooperativeness of the strategies to 0.77 in order to see whether the 
evolution trend for even better cooperators did match with that in the earlier 
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case. The trend lines in Figure 7.6 show that they are in line to the trend seen 
in Figure 7.5.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.6. Evolution of cooperative players with cooperation probability ≥ 0.77 in a decision 
theoretic setting at different Threshold levels  
Thus, the result here suggests that the decision theoretic model applied to the 
simulation system have played a constructive role in promoting cooperation. 
The increase of the cooperative population with the increase in strictness of 
the threshold value exhibits the efficiency of the system that we have 
designed.      
The second thing that we asses to evaluate the systems efficiency is the 
cooperativeness index (CoopIndex). Population study limits itself to the study 
of certain efficiency only. With cooperativeness index, contribution of the 
cooperativeness of weakest strategy is also considered. This means that 
cooperativeness index and the trend in its evolution are much expressive 
forms of the evolution of cooperation. Error! Reference source not found., 
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Figure 7.8 and Figure 7.9 show the evolution of cooperativeness in the three 
different threshold levels. The trend lines have been presented separately for 
better visuals. 
 
 
Figure 7.7 Evolution of CoopIndex at TH =0 
 
 
Figure 7.8 Evolution of CoopIndex at TH =5 
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Figure 7.9 Evolution of CoopIndex at TH =9 
The first trend line in Figure 7.7 shows a relatively fluctuating curve as 
compared to the other two thresholds. In terms of the levels of fluctuations, 
they have seen to be decreasing with the increasing threshold levels. 
Fluctuations represent inconsistencies in the evolving strategies, hence the 
lesser the fluctuation the better the results. However, as compared to the 
fluctuations that were seen in the evolution of CoopIndex in the reputation 
based threshold models presented in chapter 6, the fluctuations in the current 
case seem to be more. This is primarily due to the fact that payoffs for 
transactions in the current models are based on dynamic cooperation 
probabilities of the players. In earlier case, as the cooperation probability was 
not considered, and the payoffs were solely based on the value of the 
commodity, the payoffs assumed stagnant values with the increasing threshold 
barrier.   
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Besides fluctuation, another thing to look for is whether or not index lies at or 
above the value of one. Values lower than one signifies that cooperating 
instances in the weakest strategy are greater than that in the strongest 
strategy. The results show that in case of a higher expectation of TH=9, the 
index has maintained a value greater than one most of the times, and that it 
has assumed a more stable value of one towards the  later phase of evolution. 
The average of the indexes through generations presented in Figure 7.10 
shows that at TH=9 the average itself is above one.  
 
 
Figure 7.10. The average CoopIndex at different threshold levels 
Finally, we analyse the average utility evolution part. Average payoffs directly 
represent the gain through each transaction, but indirectly they can also be 
interpreted to predict what actions among the players might have been 
dominant. A very high average payoff, which is greater than the one that would 
be obtained through mutual cooperation suggests defection for cooperation to 
be a dominant strategy- as this gives a very high temptation payoff. At the 
same time very low average values can be interpreted as saying that defection 
for defection might have been the prevailing actions among the players.  
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Figure 7.11. Evolution of average utility at different thresholds 
The trend in the average utility evolution in Figure 7.11 signifies that the 
payoffs have been best optimised by the decision theoretic system in place 
and that the optimum value was reached in case of the threshold being kept at 
9.    
This result and all the others before consistently demonstrate the efficiency of 
our decision theoretic model in filtering possible defaulters and increasing 
cooperativeness by encouraging cooperation among the players. Through the 
results, we have demonstrated the merit in our system.   
 
7.6 Summary 
In this chapter we presented the model of a decision theoretic trustworthiness 
assessment system and plugged that in to our existing experimental 
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framework to study its effectiveness in increasing cooperation among the 
transacting players in the game theoretic setting. The model based on the 
principles of the maximum expected utility besides being realistic was seen to 
be effective in cooperation building while preserving the average gain in each 
transaction. Game models of anonymous interactions in online business 
environments involve money as a part of transaction. Equating value of money 
with the price of goods- though justifiable- is not that convincing. If the value of 
money and price of the goods had same level of importance, then there would 
perhaps be an equilibrium condition and no exchange would be desired by the 
seller and buyer. In reality, money is more important to the seller and goods 
more important to buyer, and hence they transact. To represent utility of 
money in such cases, we have suggested using a utility based model like the 
one we presented in this chapter. Further interesting models that can root 
down the desire to default can be formulated using these types of models. This 
forms a basis for future work in this area.  
         
  
 
   
 
8. Chapter 8 
Conclusions, Observations and 
Future Work 
This chapter concludes the thesis by providing a summary of the 
accomplishments. Some observations and future work in this area are also 
presented.   
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8.1. Conclusions 
In this thesis we first introduced the notion of trust and reputation, and 
presented an adapted definition to suit our context. An overview of the state of 
the art in managing trust and reputation in online market places, Peer to Peer 
Settings, Multi-agent environment and Mobile ad-hoc networks was presented. 
Through the review of the literature, a trustworthiness assessment problem 
was identified and presented in Chapter 3. A trust metric model to assess 
trustworthiness between interacting agents was developed by identifying 
parameters that would be of importance in such settings. This model 
presented in Chapter 4 illustrated the way in which reputation information 
could be used in computing a decimal reference value to express other party‟s 
reliability. The model is believed to be simple and comprehensive in a way that 
it combines self view as well as community view through witness agents, and 
also that it takes care of the need to filter out the contribution of potentially 
unfair ratings from agents.  Through simple experiments feedback assimilation 
process for the model was illustrated. Clearly, feedback calculation 
mechanisms in online business sites like eBay lack such capabilities. Thus, a 
possible application of this model, besides multi-agent environment, could be 
the online market places.   
  
In the course of research, there was a need to investigate the behaviour of 
interacting players in a situation like that of online business environments. An 
experimental framework for this was necessary in order to test the efficiency of 
any trust inferring models designed. In Chapter 5, capturing the social dilemma 
situation existing in the anonymous online business interactions, we modelled 
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a business dilemma framework based on the principles of classical prisoner‟s 
dilemma. Interactions between the players (buyer and seller) were modelled as 
a two player game. We also modelled incentive and compensation models and 
by plugging this into the experimental framework we investigated to what 
extent these models were effective in curbing the population of defectors. The 
results obtained from the application of compensation schemes showed that 
the scheme was effective in controlling the growth of top defectors only. It had 
little impact on the evolution of cooperative ones. With incentive schemes, the 
cooperative evolution was positively favoured. A conclusion derived through 
the experiments is that, these schemes, though effective to certain extent, 
need to be complemented by some additional quality assurance procedures in 
order for the online business environments to be safe enough for transactions.  
Hence the need for a robust reputation based assessment mechanism 
reported in Chapter 6 of this thesis.  
 
In this line, we modelled an acquaintance based trustworthiness assessment 
system in Chapter 6. The uniqueness of this model was in its classification of 
feedback sources, and in the measurement of cooperativeness in terms of 
Cooperativeness Index. In daily life, while taking advice or in similar situations, 
it is common to give higher value to an advice from a known source and 
probably a stranger‟s advice is counted less. We explored the impact of 
acquaintance in business game setting and the results confirmed that this new 
model had positive impact in the evolution of cooperativeness and also 
positively favoured the growth of cooperative player‟s population. 
Implementation of such model is not a difficult task. Public information on 
individual seller/buyer available over the eBay can actually be used to carve 
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such interrelationship. We have presented evidence that the online business 
sites use an acquaintance based feedback calculation to present a more 
realistic view on the opponent‟s trustworthiness.  
 
In chapter 7, we considered the utility value of money in modelling business 
game interactions by following a decision theoretic assessment approach. 
Instead of a trustworthiness threshold, this model based its decision on 
whether to play a game or not on the maximum expected utility threshold. The 
decision theoretic model provided a more realistic assessment as it considers 
the price value of transaction as well as the reputation of the player in 
computing the utility of player actions. Also, the threshold computation was 
based on price value and reputation of the player. With reputation being 
dynamic in nature, the whole payoff values as well as threshold values 
obtained were dynamic in nature. This resembles real world situation in a 
better way, because many of the times decision to buy something online 
involves assessing the goods price and the reputation of the player. Evolution 
of cooperative strategy, cooperativeness index and average utility were 
evaluated in different settings. The results consistently showed that a decision 
theoretic assessment leads to cooperation in the society.      
 In Appendix A we have tried finding a different application domain to the trust 
problem we are considering. We ventured into the domain of Mobile Ad-hoc 
networks as another application area of our reputation based trustworthiness 
assessment model. Using the concept of business games established before, 
we modelled game between a sender and an intermediary node in the context 
of mobile ad-hoc networks. The experimental results demonstrated that 
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application of the trust model positively favoured the packet drop ratio and also 
that energy savings were better in this case.  
 
A general conclusion that can be derived from all these results is that 
application of a suitable reputation model plays a constructive role in changing 
the behaviour of the players. Change in behaviour is important as it gives an 
opportunity to the players to turn into good ones. Players can learn what sort of 
act earns them higher pay off in a long run, and follow such strategy rather 
than defecting for a short term gain and remaining off the game in future 
interactions.          
8.2 Observations 
In general we see that the importance of trust model in online societies is 
continuously increasing. With the availability of distributed and autonomous 
infrastructures over huge networks like Internet, the problem of remaining safe 
online has never been as important before. Lack of trust in technology keeps 
people away from it, and this definitely is neither good for the expansion of 
technology, nor for participants as they are deprived of the benefits of 
technology. Having inbuilt system of trust promotion into applications is what is 
the need of the hour now. Such components can be effective in promoting 
general user‟s trust on the system, thus increasing the use of technology and 
harnessing maximum benefit out of it to the users. This does not only limit to 
online services but can cover other wide range of situations where dilemma on 
whether the opponent will cooperate or defect exists.       
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When we started our research, most popular application area for trust models 
were online business sites, peer to peer networks, multi agent systems and 
mobile ad-hoc networks. Today, social networking sites like facebook have 
gained significant interest of users from across the globe. Currently, in social 
networking sites, friend requests generally come from some known 
personality- which implies that there is already an existing trustworthiness level 
associated with the request. This justifies the enormous growth of such 
networks in spite of the absence of a computational trust model.    However, 
absence of suitable trust inferring systems in such environment hinders the 
potential growth of an individual‟s network if he or she was to consider 
increasing networks with anonymous friend requests. For instance, whether to 
accept or decline a request from an unknown member is purely a risk taking 
act. Had there been some reference on the new member‟s reliability, it would 
be lot easier to decide on whether to accept the new network or not. In future, 
if this type of networking platforms migrate towards providing services such as 
sharing and transmitting files, the importance of having trust assessment 
system becomes even more important. Online gaming environments and 
electronic government applications represent other potentially rich area for the 
application of trust models. 
 
The capability of our model to handle interactions between two parties only at 
a time can be taken as its limitation. While interactions between the end 
players are necessarily a two player game, the modern business scenario has 
roles of third party in it as well. For instance, the party providing escrow 
services, or that handling payments and shipments, all these are party to 
game. A more comprehensive model able to handle a game between any 
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numbers of players in it would perhaps capture the scenario even better. 
Second limitation is in terms of filtering possibly dishonest feedback by player. 
The third limitation is the utility measures being based only on the price value 
of goods and reputation. Section 8.3 explains how each of these current 
limitations can form a basis for the future work.  
 
The most challenging aspect of this research was unavailability of the real 
data. The only source of data for research perhaps could be made available by 
e-commerce vendors like eBay. But for the customer privacy reason such data 
would not be made available to public. Had such data been available, this 
research could have been even more interesting in a sense that we would 
have been able to analyse real behavioural data. This would have by passed 
the need to construct the simulation model and at the same time the results 
could perhaps have been even more interesting.  
 
If this research was to start over again, we would actually choose a more 
specified domain of social networking. Though, social networking sites lack 
trust models, public survey could be conducted in this scenario to formulate 
real behavioural data. Further the exploding popularity of online social 
networking sites could benefit from a trust model to keep its environment safe. 
Besides Networking, importance of social trust over the Web is rapidly 
increasing with the increasing production of interactive user contents, Jennifer 
Goldbeck in her recent publication Goldbeck (2009) highlights the importance 
of having suitable trust model to identify the trustworthiness of user generated 
interactive contents over the web.                
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8.3 Future Work 
Although our research has answered several questions related to 
interrelationships between trust and cooperation, it has also opened up several 
other questions and further research opportunities. In the subsections below, 
we provide very high level descriptions of such research possibilities.    
8.3.1 Reputation and Trust Models 
In the thesis, a trustworthiness model was first presented in Chapter 4; later on 
this was further enhanced with the features of an acquaintance based 
assimilation mechanism in chapter 6. The basic ingredient of our model is 
binary ratings in the player society, where successful transactions add up to 
the positive score, and an unsuccessful transaction adds up as a negative 
score. Binary rating has remained a very popular quantifying mechanism for 
feedback scores. Many different online business sites and recommenders use 
this mechanism to compute a rating.  
 
There is a potential improvement to binary rating scores. Experiences of a 
transaction might not always be as easy to represent in black and white. For 
example, if a user was very much satisfied with the seller‟s price, but then its 
delivery time was unacceptable, then it becomes difficult for the user to 
express his/her feelings in terms of success or failure of transaction. If the user 
would say the transaction was a success by giving a positive vote, he was in 
fact not fully satisfied with the seller‟s delivery. If the user generalises and says 
that the transaction was a failure, he is not doing justice to the seller. One 
possible way to represent such scenario is to have a rating scale for each 
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evaluation parameter of a transaction. Suitable methods like fuzzy logic can be 
used to aggregate feedback score out of such individual scaled ratings. Such a 
method allows the feedback to be more realistic as this captures many aspects 
of its evaluation.  
 
Another possible improvement is in the filtering mechanisms for unfair ratings. 
In our approach we apply the player‟s own reputation as a weight factor to its 
credibility. This is a widely accepted practice, but more concentrated research 
in unfair ratings can provide better mechanism to support this. Applying a 
median filter to the data gathered from society could possibly be an improved 
method to tackle this problem. Discover and application of these techniques is 
inevitable amidst the growth of strategic system users. In a recent publication, 
importance of having a robust Trust and Reputation system have been 
underlined by renowned security experts Audon Josang and Jennifer Goldbeck 
in Josang and Goldbeck (2009).  
 
As far as applications are concerned, reputation and trust inferring systems for 
Social Networking sites like facebook seem to be the need of the hour. Our 
research primarily concentrated in business settings, but there is a whole new 
area for the application of trust model brought forward by the huge popularity 
of social networking sites in the recent. Such a need is also supported by a 
recent publication in Lazzari (2010).     
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8.3.2 Evolution of Cooperation 
The business game framework that we have modelled in chapter 5 represents 
a two player game. In the present context, many online transactions concern 
two players buyer and seller. Our model rightly captures this. However, a 
future possibility of having a full fledged online business to business trade 
demands more expressive business models. For instance, in such scenario, 
besides the buyer and seller, there could be several third party members in the 
game. E.g. Transportation Company, insurance company, wholesalers, 
retailers etc. To represent all these members of the supply chain a suitable n-
player version of the game is required.    
 
Another area of future work in this context could possibly be in identifying the 
rationality of strategies. Our research primarily concerned the investigation of 
cooperativeness. There could be an interesting research area in the 
identification of rationality of a player‟s strategy, and its interrelationship with 
the payoff and evolution of cooperation.  
Studying the variation in the length of memory for games and its impact on the 
cooperative evolution is also a potentially rich area for future work.  
8.3.3 Decision Theoretic Assessment 
Decision theoretic assessment was seen as a very practical way of evaluating 
the worthiness of a transaction. In our experiments we modelled decision 
theoretic assessments based on two criteria only: the price value of the goods 
and reputation of player. A more detailed design can actually have more than 
these two parameters. For instance, as suggested in 9.3.2 above, if the game 
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is in between more than two players, an enhanced decision theoretic 
assessment would be required to capture the scenario.  
 
While illustrating the application of reputation systems in the mobile ad-hoc 
setting, we did not consider a decision theoretic assessment. This was 
primarily because researching the communication layer issues of the mobile 
ad-hoc settings was clearly out of the scope of our research. There is 
potentially a useful application of a decision theoretic assessment in a mobile 
ad-hoc setting. The motive to conserve energy among the nodes could 
possibly be a good utility measure in this case.  
   
 
9. Appendix A 
Trust Assessment with an 
Application to Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks 
In this chapter, we present an application of the reputation based trust assessment 
model, the design of which was explained in detail in chapter 6 of this write up. The 
main aim of this chapter has been to present the generality of the trust model 
developed earlier (in Chapter 6) by testing its effectiveness is a mobile ad hoc network 
setting. A game between the Sender (originator) and Intermediary nodes in the 
network is modelled and plugged-in to our experimental framework described in 
earlier chapters.  Through our experiments we show that having the trust model 
decreases the Packet Drop Ratio (PDR) in an ad hoc network setting. Further, the 
results also show that the Gain through the utility and savings of energy is better with 
the application of the trust model.       
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A.1 Introduction and Background 
Trust and Reputation management issues are critical in networks with nodes 
performing services on behalf of the other nodes, the examples of this include P2P, 
Grid, and wireless ad hoc networks (Mackenzie and Dasilva, 2006). In ad hoc 
networks the behaviour of individual nodes has profound impact on the overall 
network performance – due to the fact that there is no centralized control(Srinivasan et 
al., 2003). The review of related literature on mobile ad hoc networks and the need of 
assessing trustworthiness of nodes before forwarding a packet were highlighted in 
section 2.3.4 of chapter 2. While outlining the need of such an assessment system, 
some of the existing approaches towards the computation were also discussed. Our 
approach builds on the existing work as this uses a noble acquaintance based 
aggregation method that was described in chapter 6. We see that significance of an 
acquaintance based aggregation method is high in mobile ad hoc settings as well. In 
general, mobile ad hoc networks are perceived as dynamic, temporary and strategic 
network, but, certain flavours of it can also permit repeated interactions within a fixed 
group. Examples of such settings can be class room networks, which though 
temporary, might have repeated interactions. Other example can be a network of 
frequent, loyal customers of a Coffee Shop enjoying networking with other visitors. 
The later example also includes repeated interactions. Thus, in settings like this, it 
becomes sensible to weigh the reputation of individual nodes based on the nature of 
past association.  
Evolutionary game theory has been popularly used in the study of cooperation in 
wireless ad hoc networks. In models close to ours, (Seredynski et al., 2007) have 
proposed a game based model to examine cooperative evolution between the nodes of 
APPENDIX A. TRUST ASSESMENT WITH AN APPLICATION                         157 
the network. Their results show that the proposed game based model enforced 
cooperation in the society. The authors say that their model has similarities with 
Iterated  Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Pragad et al (2005) have investigated into the 
applicability of evolutionary game theory in the context of mobile ad hoc networks. 
The results positively conclude on its suitability.  In Srinivasan et al. (2003) the 
problem of cooperation among energy constrained nodes in wireless ad hoc networks 
is addressed. The authors have used game theory to show the existence of an operating 
point which optimally trades off throughput with lifetime. Our experimentation here is 
also based on the evolutionary game theory. Game theoretic models representing 
scenarios for mobile ad hoc settings have been simulated using the concept of Iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. The game model and results obtained are explained in the 
subsequent sections.   
 
A.2 The Game Model 
The game conceptualised here is in between two parties, namely the Sender Node (S) 
and the Intermediary Node (I). In this game we do not consider the target node as it 
has no influence in packet transmission. It is because we are not considering a 
situation where packets are only carried for certain selected nodes. A sender node is 
the one that initiates the transmission of the packets, which the intermediary nodes will 
have to relay to the final destination node. As a characteristics of nodes in an ad hoc 
network, each node being powered by battery, has a limited amount of energy 
available to process its own data in addition to that of forwarding packets for others. 
Thus, there lies a tendency among the nodes to conserve energy through a Deceptive 
act of dropping packets from the sender nodes. The presence of malicious nodes 
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makes the situation further complex. A malicious sender node originates packets 
which have ill motive of draining energy resources of peers in the network. When a 
significant number of malicious packets are present in the network, it leads to a 
bandwidth choke.   In this scenario, the two possible moves and there meanings for 
each type of node are: 
a. Sender Node (S): For a sender node, a cooperating act (C) means forwarding 
a genuine packet for transmission. Defection (D) means sending malicious packet to 
intermediary nodes for transmission. 
b. Intermediary Node (I): For an intermediary node, a cooperating act (C) 
means forwarding the packets from the sender node to the designated final node or an 
intermediary node en-route.  A deceptive act (D) in this case means dropping the 
packets (not forwarding). 
 
Let   represent the unit of energy consumed by each transmission and Ԍ be the gain 
associated with any transmission. For simplicity reasons, we assume that gain Ԍ of a 
transaction can be expressed as a numerical value. This is possible, as we have 
established it through the maximum expected utility model in chapter 7 before. 
Further, we assume that the gain obtained through defection is    times the gain that 
would have been obtained through cooperation. Here,    is an integer and is greater 
than or equal to 1 (   ). Also for the purpose of our model, we consider energy to 
have certain numerical representation which is compatible with the gain value. The 
four different possible outcomes (in terms of payoff) of the game between a sender 
node and intermediary node are explained below: 
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CASE I: Sender Cooperates, Intermediary also cooperates  
In this situation, the sender node forwarded a genuine packet and the Intermediary 
node forwarded the packet in turn to next level. Both of the nodes receive a reward 
pay off.  We quantify this as the total gain Ԍ minus the energy consumed for the 
transmission. Thus, 
Reward Sender,   RS  → (Ԍ -                                    (A.1) 
Reward Intermediary,             RI  → (Ԍ -                                     (A.2) 
 
CASE II: Sender Cooperates, Intermediary Defects 
The sender node in this case sent a genuine packet for transmission, but the 
Intermediary node dropped it. The sender node here receives a Sucker’s Payoff which 
is quantified in terms of loss of the expected gain and energy. The defecting 
intermediary receives a Temptation Payoff, which is equal to savings in energy plus 
the multiplied gain. Thus, 
Sucker’s Sender,  SS  → - ( Ԍ +       (A.3) 
Temptation Intermediary, TI  → ((  *Ԍ) +         (A.4) 
 
CASE III: Sender Defects, Intermediary Cooperates 
In this case, the sender node defected by forwarding a malicious packet to the 
intermediary, while the intermediary forwarded the packet further on. The sender 
receives a Temptation Payoff equivalent to the multiplied gain (less the energy spent), 
while the intermediary receives a Sucker’s Payoff equivalent to loss in energy and 
gain.  
Temptation Sender, TS  →     * Ԍ  -   )      (A.5) 
Sucker’s Intermediary, SI  → - ( Ԍ +        (A.6) 
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CASE IV: Sender Defects, Intermediary also Defects 
The sender node in this case defects by forwarding a malicious packet, and the 
intermediary node also defects by dropping the packet. Both in this case receive a 
Punishment Payoff. As the packet was dropped, sender could not gain anything out of 
the malicious transmission, thus its payoff can be represented by the loss in the 
amount of transmission energy. For the intermediary, it conserved its energy, but it 
lost the expected gain out of the transmission. Thus, 
 
Punishment Sender,   PS  → -       (A.7) 
Punishment Intermediary, PI  → - Ԍ    (A.8) 
 
Based on the constraints for dilemma in the prisoner’s dilemma game (chapter 5, 
equations 2.1 and 2.2), we have the following payoff inequalities (between temptation, 
reward, punishment and the sucker’s) for the sender and the intermediary nodes 
imposed throughout the experiments. The numerical values for these parameters 
during the experiments were chosen such that it honours the fundamental requirements 
for the dilemma to exist.    
 
a. For Sender Node 
    * Ԍ  -   ) > (Ԍ -      -   - ( Ԍ +    , and                                        (A.9) 
 
(Ԍ -    
      Ԍ             Ԍ     
 
           (A.10) 
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b. For Intermediary Node 
 
((  *Ԍ) +      Ԍ       - Ԍ > - ( Ԍ +   , and    (A.11) 
 
 
(Ԍ -    
      Ԍ             Ԍ     
 
    (A.12) 
 
We use this payoff model to simulate our experiments, the results of which are 
explained in section A.3.  
 
A.3 Experimental Setting and Results 
Our experiment here concerns the application of the acquaintance based 
trustworthiness assessment model established in chapter 6 to the mobile ad hoc game 
described in A.2. We investigate effectiveness of the trust model by analysing two 
factors in particular; i. the packet drops in the network, ii. trend in the Gain of the 
nodes.  
For the simulation, we use the same experimental setting described in section 5.3 with 
modifications on the number of nodes, evolution length, and payoff model, making it 
more suitable to the mobile ad hoc setting. The reputation threshold model we use here 
is based on the acquaintance model described in section 6.2. 
 
We consider an ad-hoc network of 25 nodes, where each node would act alternately as 
a sender and forwarder. At a particular time, the sender-forwarder pair would play the 
forwarding-dropping game as explained in section A.2. We conducted the experiment 
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with various settings for the number of iterations for the game (number of games to be 
played before calculating a strategies’ fitness), and the length of the evolution. Our 
simulation result showed that for 25 nodes, with 10 iterations, an evolution length of 
50 generations would show stability in the average gain of the nodes. Thus, we choose 
an iteration value of 10 and evolution length of 50 generations for the whole 
experiments.    Crossover probability and mutation probability were kept fixed at 0.98 
and 0.01 respectively.  
For the experiment, we assume a numerical value of 5 for the maximum gain (Ԍ) and 
a value of 2 for the multiplier factor     Further, we assume that each transmission of 
packet (whether malicious or genuine) will consume a unit energy. With these values, 
we see that the inequalities in equation A.9, A.10, A.11, A.12 are fulfilled, meaning 
that there exists a dilemma on whether to cooperate or defect.  
We conducted the simulations, the results of which are presented and explained in the 
sub-sections below. 
A.3.1 Result I: Packet Drop Ratio 
The first thing we analysed in the experiment was the impact of our reputation model 
in the Packet Drop Ratio. A Packet Drop Ratio is the ratio of the total packets dropped 
by a node to that of forwarded ones. Thus, the lower the ratio, the better is the 
cooperativeness of the nodes.  
We first carried out the simulation in a setting where there was no presence of a 
reputation model at all. Followed by this was a game with a small reputation threshold 
of 0.2, progressing further to an expected trustworthiness of 0.5, and 0.9. The concept 
of reputation threshold was described in detail in section 6.2. The packet drop ratio for 
the 25 nodes obtained after an evolution is given in Figure A.1. 
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Figure A.1 Packet Drop Ratio for the nodes in network 
The result trend here shows that the packet drop ratio for the nodes was high with no 
reputation system at all, and that they lowered with the increase in the expected 
cooperation from the opponents.  Figure A.2 shows average of these ratios at various 
thresholds. 
 
Figure A.2 Average Packet Drop ratio at various thresholds 
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An average packet drop ratio of 1.39 was seen when there was no reputation system. 
This lowered down to 0.80 with threshold of 0.2, to 0.28 at threshold 0.5 and 0.09 at 
threshold 0.9. This trend shows that, an ad hoc network setting without a reputation 
based assessment model is very vulnerable to packet drops and malicious packet 
forwarding. With our reputation system in place the tendency to drop packets and 
forward malicious packets were reduced significantly. This has shown the 
effectiveness of our model.  
A.3.2 Result II: Average Gain  
The other thing we have analysed through our experiments is the average gain 
obtained through each transmission throughout the evolution length of 50 generations. 
The two factors that contribute to gain (Ԍ) in our ad hoc game model are the energy 
factor and the multiplier factor. The energy factor contributes to gain by conserving 
each node’s energy (by dropping packets), and the multiplier factor increases the gain 
by obtaining payoff for deceptive behaviour. Figure A.3 shows that evolution trend of 
the average gain.  
 
Figure A.3 Evolution of Average Gain in different thresholds 
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The result seen in the graph is in line with the average packet drop ratio in a sense that, 
in each category, with decreasing packet drops, the average gain has increased. This 
shows that the reputation model applied to the network setting has played a 
constructive role in optimising the transaction gain and energy savings. The fact that 
the average gain did not cross the maximum gain value of 5 that we had chosen for the 
experiments show that our model has discouraged the contribution of defection due to 
multiplier effect in payoff.  
Both of the results above have shown that our model has been effective in curbing 
temptation of nodes to defect each other. This shows effectiveness of our model with 
its application to mobile ad hoc network settings.  
A.4 Summary 
This chapter discussed an application of our acquaintance based trust assessment 
model in the mobile ad hoc network setting. The effectiveness of the model was 
demonstrated by the system’s capability to enhance cooperation between the nodes by 
decreasing the packet drop ratio and optimising the gain. This application, in a setting 
other than online business games, has confirmed the possibility of the use of the model 
in various settings that lack centralised infrastructure to control the quality of service. 
This opens the door to adoption of our model also in other non-business related peer to 
peer, autonomous agent societies and social networking applications. Adoption of 
decision theoretic model for such settings is a possible future work, as consideration of 
the network specific parameters as utility might suggest better and efficient models. 
As design of such a decision theoretic model concerns deeper investigation into the 
communication layer architecture of mobile ad-hoc networks, we have not ventured 
into it in this current research work.   
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